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“Leading Political Scientists Warn of Threat to American Democracy in Rare
Nonpartisan Statement,”1

Democracy in the United States of America is in decline. In much the same way that
progressive tort reform was made possible by the democratic gains of the mid twentieth century,
much of the current tort retrenchment has been made possible by our democratic losses since the
late twentieth century. Just as tort reform in the 1960s and 1970s helped consolidate and protect
our democratic gains, the tort “reforms” from the 1980s to the present have helped further
consolidate and protect our rising plutocracy.
After a brief introduction setting the stage for the argument that follows, part II details the
extent of our economic inequality while parts III and IV show how our economic inequality is
bound up with political inequality and the demise of our democracy, both in terms of being heard
by those who represent us (part III), and in terms of having a voice to reach those who represent
us (part IV). Gross inequality in political voice is bound up with a lack of responsiveness and
accountability and this in turn leads to the erosion of government interventions to correct or
counterbalance the ever widening gap between the “haves” and “have-nots.” As Part V
illustrates, interventions by the courts and legislators in the area of torts follows this model. This
is illustrated by counter-democratic interventions by the Supreme Court as well as the bulk of
tort reform efforts since the 1980s. Part V, will first briefly address the larger terrain of tort

1

Press Release, American Political Science Association, Leading Political Scientists Warn of Threat to American
Democracy in Rare Nonpartisan Statement (2004), www.apsanet.org/imgtest/taskforce. See also E. J. Dionne Jr.,
Poor Version of Democracy, WASHINGTON POST, June 11, 2004, at A25 (calling attention to and commenting on the
Task Force report), available at http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/articles/A33144-2004Jun10.html.
Although not conceived as such, this article, in effect, is a response to the challenge raised by Nockleby and Curreri,
“that those who wish to defend the civil justice system against retrenchment should explicitly address how the legal
system changed from 1900 to 1980 to grant far more protections to citizens.” John T. Nockleby & Shannon Curreri,
100 Years of Conflict: The Past and Future of Tort Retrenchment, 38 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 1021, 1023 (2005).
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reform (both progressive and regressive) before turning to the role of the Supreme Court in tort
reform. The article concludes with a few comments on developments in the area of products
liability that may cast a ray of hope on the otherwise gloomy condition of tort law and
democracy in America.
I

INTRODUCTION

While we wage war in distant lands for the purported purpose of spreading democracy,
our own democracy is under threat. The threat is not external; it does not come from communists
or terrorists, but from deep within the fabric of our society. It does not come solely nor even
primarily from the president, the conservative right, or our national leaders, although they are
part of the problem. Rather, the threat comes from an ever widening gap between those who have
and those who do not have:
•

a stake in this country,

•

a voice and hand in shaping this country’s future,

•

and the ears of others who are shaping that future.
Thus, the gap between the “haves” and “have nots” is not merely economic but cuts

across both socio-economic aspects of life (education, jobs, income, mobility) and civil and
political aspects of life (the ability to participate in civic and political life, through voting,
volunteering, protesting, donating, etc.). This, in turn, impacts the responsiveness of government
to the needs and preferences of the people.
This account of the derailing of our democracy is not based on an elaborate or idealistic
view of democracy. It is not based on shattering the illusion of direct democratic participation, or
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on the dream of a truly deliberative democracy, 2 or even a republican democracy.3 The standard
is not the equal provision of conditions for human development and self actualization, 4 nor even
the ideal of equal concern and respect, although we are failing on all these accounts.5 No, the
critique is based on the failure of even achieving the modest ambitions of representative
democracy. The standard is based on the rather simple notions that democracy consists of “…
government of the people, by the people, for the people"6 and that a “a key characteristic of a
democracy is the continuing responsiveness of the government to the preferences of its citizens,
considered as political equals”7 Democracy requires accountability and respect for the rule of
law and this entails equality before the law. It also requires transparency and access to accurate
information, for without it, “the people” have no chance of authentic participation, or of holding
representatives accountable. As will be detailed below, our democracy is failing, because we do
not have government by, of, or for the people; those who govern are not responsive to the people,
considered as political equals.

2

The argument does not rely on a conception of democracy that is as rich as deliberative democracy, which requires
not only that representatives represent the populace, but that they should have inclusive deliberations about the
decisions they make and justify their decision with publicly acceptable reasons. A GUTMANN & D THOMPSON, WHY
DELIBERATIVE DEMOCRACY 3 (2004).
3
JÜRGEN HABERMAS, Three Normative Models of Democracy, in DEMOCRACY AND DIFFERENCE: CONTESTING THE
BOUNDARIES OF THE POLITICAL, (CH. 1) (Seyla Benhabib ed., 1996) (comparing liberal, republican and deliberative
forms of democracy).
4
McPherson identifies the underlying moral value of democracy as “provid[ing] the conditions for the free
development of human capacities, and to do this equally for all members of society.” C.B. MACPHERSON THE REAL
WORLD OF DEMOCRACY 58 (1966).
5
Ronald Dworkin’s view of our Constitution is “that it aims to create …a "partnership" rather than a majoritarian
form of democracy by insisting that all citizens are entitled to an equal role and voice in their self-government, that
government at all levels must treat citizens with equal concern, and that government must leave individual citizens
free to make the personal decisions for themselves that they cannot yield to others without compromising their selfrespect.” Ronald Dworkin, Judge Roberts on Trial, 52 NEW YORK REVIEW OF BOOKS (Oct. 2005), available at,
http://www.nybooks.com/articles/18330#fnr6 (referring to his elaboration of this ideal in FREEDOM'S LAW (1996),
and SOVEREIGN VIRTUE (2000)).
6
Abraham Lincoln , 16th President of the United States of America (1961-65), The Gettysburg Address (Nov. 19,
1863). Even the U.S. State Department begins its discussion of the definition of “What is Democracy” with
Lincoln’s definition, http://usinfo.state.gov/products/pubs/whatsdem/whatdm2.htm.
7
ROBERT DAHL, POLIARCHY: PARTICIPATION AND OPPOSITION 1 (1971). Note, this is a standard liberal notion of
democracy.

3

Although it is not uncommon to hear of references to our founding as a democratic
founding, this is not an accurate depiction of our history.8 It took the United States nearly 200
years to achieve a level of political participation which would justify the claim that it was a
democracy. As C.B. MacPherson pointed out long ago,

In our Western societies the democratic franchise was not installed until after the
liberal society and the liberal state were firmly established. Democracy came as a
top dressing. It had to accommodate itself to the soil that had already been
prepared by the operation of the competitive, individualist, market society, and by
the operation of the liberal state, which served that society through a system of
competing though not democratic political parties. It was the liberal state that was
democratized, and in the process, democracy was liberalized.9

It is difficult to speak at all about American democracy prior to 1920 when women
finally won the right to vote.10 But further, as Alexander Keyssar notes, until the 1960s most
African Americans could not vote in the South,11 and “As late as 1950s, basic political rights
were denied [not only to those blacks in the South but]…to significant pockets of voters
elsewhere, including the illiterate in New York, Native Americans in Utah, many Hispanics in
Texas and California, and the recently mobile everywhere.12

8

Even Jay Feinman refers to the United States at its founding as “the newly democratic” America. JAY M. FEINMAN,
UNMAKING LAW: THE CONSERVATIVE CAMPAIGN TO ROLL BACK THE COMMON LAW 56 (2004).
9
MACPHERSON, supra note 4, at 5.
10
U.S. CONST. amend XIX. Note that 12 of the western territories along with New York extended the franchise to
women before the Amendment. ALEXANDER KEYSSAR, THE RIGHT TO VOTE: THE CONTESTED HISTORY OF
DEMOCRACY IN THE UNITED STATES 211-218, app. at 390 (Table A.20 States and Territories Fully Enfranchising
Women Prior to the Nineteenth Amendment) (2001).
11
Id at xvi.
12
Id at 316. Universal suffrage is not a right enshrined on our constitution.
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Part of the myth that the current rollback of torts is compatible with democracy is based
on the misconception that the founding was democratic. However, the classical liberal state was
not democratic and thus it should not be surprising that the common law and tort law were not
supportive of democracy. The common law system largely presumed equality and freedom while
exploiting the lack thereof, for example, by limiting access to courts for the poor, allowing those
with superior bargaining power to bind and keep the gains of unequal power through contract
and tort law and by providing remedies that replicated status quo inequalities. It was not until the
early 1900s that tort law started its modern trend towards the expansion of liability, and this
really did not take off, so to speak, until the 1960s.13
The 1960s and 1970s were decades of considerable progress in civil and political rights
as well as for socio-economic rights.14 These advances came from increased political
participation, and from executive,15 legislative16 and judicial developments.17 They were also
years in which our democracy was further consolidated through progressive reform of the
common law in general and torts in particular.18 It was not mere coincidence that progressive

13

FEINMAN, supra note 8, at 53.
President Carter even signed the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights in 1977,
although it was never ratified by Congress, see http://www.unhchr.ch/pdf/report.pdf.
15
For instance, The War on Poverty which was introduced by Lyndon B. Johnson during his State of the Union
address (Jan. 8, 1964), as well as proposed legislation which culminated in the Economic Opportunity Act and the
Establishment of the Office of Economic Opportunity.
16
See, e.g. The Equal Pay Act of 1963, Pub. L. No. 88-38, 77 Stat. 56 (1963); Economic Opportunity Act of 1964,
Pub. L. No. 88-452, § 1, 78 Stat. 508 (1964); Civil Rights Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-352, Title II, § 201, 78 Stat.
243 (1964); Social Security Act of 1965, Pub. L. No. 86-778, Title VII, § 701(a)-(e), 74 Stat. 992, 993 (1965); and
The Age Discrimination Act of 1967 (ADEA), Pub. L. No. 90-202, § 2, 81 Stat. 602 (1967). Title VII of the Civil
Rights Act of 1964 also created the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC), Pub. L. No. 88-352, Title
VII, § 701, 78 Stat. 253. The EEOC obtained enforcement authority under the Equal Opportunity Act of 1972; Pub.
L. No. 92-318, Title IX, 86 Stat. 235 (1972)) (Education Amendments prohibit sex discrimination in all aspects of
education programs that receive federal money); The Pregnancy Discrimination Act, Pub. L. No. 95-555, § 1, 92
Stat. 2076 (1978).
17
For a list of landmark cases, see, e.g., Michael L. Rustad & Thomas H. Koenig, Taming the Tort Monster: The
American Civil Justice System as a Battleground of Social Theory, 68 BROOK. L. REV. 1, Appendix One: American
Tort Law Timeline: 1200-2002 (2002 ).
18
See section V. B infra. Although torts still reflected social inequalities, the reforms during the 60s provided easier
access to courts and better protection for consumers. Constitutional torts also emerged during this period, with
14
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tort reform tracked the coming to age of our democracy. It was made possible by the democratic
gains of the 1960s and 1970s and helped consolidate and protect those gains.
Since the 1980s those democratic gains have been eroding. As Keyssar states, “Although
the formal right to vote is now nearly universal, few observers would characterize the United
States as a vibrant democracy.”19 In 2004 the American Political Science Association came out
with its warning that American democracy was in peril. They did so with the press release
quoted at the beginning of this article,20 and through a set of reports commissioned by the
Association.21 Those reports located the cause of this demise in the widening gap between rich
and poor, as its authors state, “progress toward realizing the American ideals of democracy may
have stalled, and in some arenas reversed” due to the broadening gap in income and wealth in
America.22
As our democracy appears to be on the decline, around the world, democracy seems to be
on the rise. The late 1980s brought about a whole wave of democratic revolutions in Europe,
Africa and Latin America.23 Arguably, the US has had a number of constitutional revolutions
between the foundings and the present.24 Few, if any, would argue that these revolutions, past or
Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167 (1961) and Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Federal Bureau of Narcotics,
403 U.S. 388 (1971).
19
KEYSSAR, supra note 10 at 4, at 322. For the view that our democracy is crumbling based on current obstacles to
voting see, SPENCER OVERTON, STEALING DEMOCRACY: THE NEW POLITICS OF VOTER
SUPPRESSION (2006).
20
Press release, supra note 1.
21
The task force compiled a series of reports in 2004: AMERICAN DEMOCRACY IN AN AGE OF RISING INEQUALITY;
THREE CRITICAL ANALYSES ON ECONOMIC, GENDER, RACIAL, AND ETHNIC INEQUALITIES IN AMERICAN POLITICS; and
a set of teaching materials. Apsanet.org, Task Force on Inequality and American Democracy,
http://www.apsanet.org/section_256.cfm (last visited July 9, 2006). These materials were edited into a book.
INEQUALITY AND AMERICAN DEMOCRACY: WHAT WE KNOW AND WHAT WE NEED TO LEARN (Lawrence Jacobs &
Theda Skocpol eds., 2005).
22
AMERICAN POLITICAL SCIENCE ASSOCIATION, AMERICAN DEMOCRACY IN THE AGE OF RISING INEQUALITY 1
(2004), http://www.apsanet.org/imgtest/taskforcereport.pdf.
23
See, e.g. SAMUEL P. HUNTINGTON, THE THIRD WAVE: DEMOCRATIZATION IN THE LATE TWENTIETH CENTURY
(1993).
24
According to Ackerman, the US has gone through three historical ruptures or transitions brought about by
heightened democratic participation resulting in “higher law making”: the extra legal Founding which did not follow
the procedures set out in the articles of Confederation, the 13th and 14th Reconstruction amendments which bypassed
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present, have been as fundamental as those revolutions brought about by the third wave of
democratization in the late 80s and early 90s.25 Even fewer would consider themselves to be in
the throws of a revolution, or in the recent aftermath of such a revolution.26 Yet, a number of
commentators have characterized the culmination of changes brought about by the Rehnquist
Court over the last two decades in these very terms.27 Andrew Seigel recently noted that those
commentating on the history of the Rehnquist Court are nearly uniform in their view that “…
Chief Justice Rehnquist and his allies on the Court instigated a judicial "revolution" that has
fundamentally altered both the substance of American law and the institutional arrangements
through which we develop and enforce legal norms.”28

the proper Article V procedures and the New Deal amendments which took place largely through the pressure
brought to bear on the courts to switch in time in order to save the nine Supreme Court justices from having to share
the bench with a few more judges. BRUCE ACKERMAN, WE THE PEOPLE: FOUNDATIONS 42-44 (1991). Contrary to
these constitutional moments the current revolution is not a democratic moment of higher law making.
25
See RUTI G. TEITEL, TRANSITIONAL JUSTICE 206-209 (2002) (arguing that even our founding revolution was
conservative compared to many of the legal transitions that took place around the world in the 90s). Our founding
revolution was conservative because, contrary to popular belief, it did not establish a political system that was
markedly different, in democratic terms, from the British system that preceded it.
26
Perhaps we are now in a phase of consolidation. As Andrew Siegel puts it, “In rough cut, one might suggest that
the years prior to 1994 represent rehearsal and experimentation with the agenda for the Rehnquist Revolution, the
period from 1994 until 2002 or 2003, the years of the Revolution, and the years since then a period of consolidation
or retrenchment.” Andrew Siegel, The Court Against the Courts: Hostility to Litigation as an Organizing Them in
the Rehnquist Court’s Jurisprudence, 84 TEX. L. REV. 1097, 1112 (2006).
27
Jack M. Balkin & Sanford Levinson, Understanding the Constitutional Revolution, 87 VA. L. REV. 1045 (2001).
See also CHARLES J. OGLETREE, JR., THE REHNQUIST REVOLUTION IN CRIMINAL PROCEDURE, IN THE REHNQUIST
COURT: JUDICIAL ACTIVISM ON THE RIGHT 55 (2002); Larry D. Kramer, The Supreme Court, 2000 Term-Foreword: We The Court, 115 HARV. L. REV. 4, 130 (2001); Sylvia A. Law, In the Name of Federalism: The
Supreme Court's Assault on Democracy and Civil Rights, 70 U. CIN. L. REV. 367, 370 (2002) (critiquing the
"federalism revolution"); cf. Mark Tushnet, Alarmism Versus Moderation in Responding to the Rehnquist Court,
78 IND. L. J. 47, 49-52 (2003) ( taking a "modest" view of the Court's rulings); Dawn Johnson, Ronald Reagan and
the Rehnquist Court on Congressional Power: Presidential Influences on Constitutional Change, 78 IND. L. J. 363,
364 (2003) (remaining agnostic about the “revolution”).
28
Siegel, supra note 26, at 1100.
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This “revolution” is routinely described in undemocratic terms. For instance, Jack Balkin
and Sanford Levinson place the Court's contraction of congressional power at the core of this
"constitutional revolution."29 Or, as Larry Kramer puts it,

The defining characteristic of that Court is not its commitment to political
conservatism nor a love of states' rights.… but … the Justices' conviction that
they and they alone are responsible for the Constitution… [A]ny notion that what
the Constitution does or permits might best be left for the people to resolve using
the ordinary devices available to express their will seems beyond the Rehnquist
Court's compass.30

The “revolution” is undemocratic, both because of the usurpation of the power of
Congress and the people and because of the erosion of mechanisms developed over time to hold
government accountable and to keep democracy on track. According to Sylvia Law, the Supreme
Court has limited the ability of Congress to address national problems to a degree only matched
by the Lochner Court’s interference with attempts by Congress and the president to respond to
the Great Depression. 31
This includes: restricting the constitutional power of Congress to regulate interstate
commerce, and to enforce the guarantees of the Fourteenth Amendment; expanding state
immunity from federally defined claims of unfair labor practices and discrimination; and
“rejecting settled interpretations of federal civil rights laws to limit the protection that Congress
29

Balkin & Levinson, supra note 27, at 1045 (noting the revolution and criticizing the bare majority of the Court
which has systematically reappraised the doctrines of federalism, racial equality, and civil rights, and who also gave
the presidency to George W. Bush).
30
Kramer, super note 27 at 158.
31
Law, supra note 27, at 371.
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has sought to give to the civil and economic rights of many vulnerable people, including older
people, people with disabilities, women, and working people.”32
It may come as little surprise that this judicial revolution also tracks the decline in
American Democracy. It may come as more of a surprise that both of these changes track the
onslaught of regressive tort reform in the U.S. In part V below, we will look at the supporting
role the Supreme Court has played in the regressive tort reform movement. This is not to say that
the Supreme Court has played a leading role in this movement, but the mere fact that the
Supreme Court is involved at all is notable. It is testament to the fact that the present counterdemocratic changes that are taking place are not merely economic or political, or limited to broad
public law areas like federalism. Rather, these changes are pervasive, cutting across the public
and private law domains.
There is very little written in the legal literature connecting tort reform to constitutional
change, much less democratic change,33 although some have been arguing for years that tort law
reflects and further entrenches the inequalities that exist in the U.S.,34 and numerous writers have

32

Id. at 371-2.
But see Jo Ellen Lind, "Procedural Swift": Complex Litigation Reform, State Tort Law, and Democratic Values 37
AKRON L. REV. 717, 719 (2004) (arguing that federal legislation moving class actions into federal courts posses
risks to the role of states in promoting the democratic values of political participation, transparency, and
accountability); Richard L. Abel, Questioning the Counter-Majoritarian Thesis: The Case of Torts, 49 DEPAUL L.
REV. 533, 556 (1999) (arguing that in the confrontation between courts and legislators in the arena tort reform “that
courts tend to be populist and deliberative, whereas legislatures tend to be captured by special interests, secretive,
hasty, and unwilling or unable to offer reasons for their actions”); John C.P. Goldberg, The Constitutional Status of
Tort Law: Due Process and the Right to a Law for the Redress of Wrongs, 115 YALE L.J. 524 (2005) (arguing for a
Constitutional Right to an adequate legal scheme for the redress of wrongs); George L. Priest, The Constitutionality
of State Tort Reform Legislation and Lochner, 31 SETON HALL L. REV. 683, 683 (2001). There are many articles
written on the subject of constitutional torts, see e.g., Thomas A. Eaton, Symposium: Re-examining First Principles:
Deterrence and Corrective Justice in Constitutional Torts 35 GA. L. REV. 837 (2001); and for the relationship
between state constitutions and tort law, see John Fabian Witt, The Long History of State Constitutions and
American Tort Law 36 RUTGERS L.J. 1159 (2005).
34
The most prominent example is Richard Abel. See, e.g., Richard Abel, The Real Tort Crisis--Too Few Claims, 48
OHIO ST. L. J. 443 (1987); Richard Abel, A Critique of American Tort Law, 8 BRITISH J. L. & SOC’Y 199-231 (1981)
(Reprinted in CRITICAL LEGAL STUDIES (Allan Hutchinson ed., Rowman & Littlefield, 1989)); Richard Abel,
General Damages are Incoherent, Incalculable, Incommensurable, and Inegalitarian (But Otherwise a Great Idea)
55 DEPAUL L. REV. 253 (2006). See also Martha Chamallas, The Architecture of Bias: Deep Structures in Tort
33
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noted that tort reform has been a product of powerful corporate interest groups and a campaign
of disinformation.35 Over the last 20 years, those inequalities have risen at unprecedented rates,
and during that same period we have seen the erosion of civil and political rights, the dismantling
of the welfare state and serious incursions into the rights of victims to access the courts and
receive full compensation for the harms they suffer.
Michael L. Rustad and Thomas H. Koenig come very close to linking democracy and tort
reform when they label the period from 1945 to 1980 “the Democratic Expansionary Era.”36
Although the facts perhaps speak for themselves, Rustad and Koenig do not actually argue for, or
explain why the period from 1945 to 1980 is an era of democratic expansion and they do not
seem to fully appreciate or at least do not argue, that the current era is a period of democratic
contraction. Jay Feinman also comes close to connecting the “un-making” of the common law to
democratic decay.37 His first main point regarding the “Right’s” attack on the common law is
that “…the law has dramatically changed to the detriment of ordinary people.”38 As he goes on
to state, “To the extent that conservatives transform the common law, injury victims will find it

Law, 146 U. PA. L. REV. 463 (arguing that deep biases in tort law result in higher damage awards for white men than
for women and minorities).
35
See, e.g., Michael L. Rustad, The Closing of Punitive Damages' Iron Cage, 38 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 1297, 1300
(2005) (“The story of the punitive damages recoil is a familiar one about special legislation to help corporate
America.” (Rustad also points to Jerry J. Phillips, Comments on the Report of the Governor's Commission on Tort
and Liability Insurance Reform, 53 TENN. L. REV. 679, 680 (1986) (punitive damages reform is about special
legislation for corporate America) and John W. Wade, Strict Products Liability: A Look at its Evolution, THE BRIEF,
Fall 1989, at 8, 56 (tort reform should be unconstitutional because it is special interest legislation)). See also Siegel,
supra note 26 at 1147 (noting the substantial energies and resources spent by American businesses in their fight for
constitutional protection against punitive damages); See also Abel, supra note 33; and FEINMAN, supra note 8. For
the view that the tort reform campaign is based on misinformation, see Abel, supra note 33; FEINMAN, supra note 10
at 48, 190-192; and Rustad & Koenig, supra note 17. See also THOMAS BAKER, THE MEDICAL MALPRACTICE MYTH
(2005) (deconstructing the myths surrounding the calls for medical malpractice reform). For misinformation
concerning punitive damages, see Eisenberg, infra note 245.
36
Rustad & Koenig, supra note 17, at 4. Nockleby & Curreri note that the first wave of tort neo-liberal tort reform
began in the 1970s. Nockleby & Curreri, supra note 1, at 1030-31.
37
FEINMAN, supra note 8. While Feinman places the blame on “radical conservatives,” “the right” and/or
“Republicans,” the problem is more pervasive than that. The lack of responsiveness cuts across party lines. For
examples of regressive legislation (including tort reform) and policies during the Clinton presidency see infra notes
67, 77, and 216.
38
FEINMAN, supra note 8, at 3.

10

harder to get into court to sue wrongdoers who hurt them, harder to win when they get there, and
harder to be adequately compensated for their injuries if they do win their suits.”39
If commentators like Abel, Baker, Feinman, Rustad and others are correct, that the
success of the regressive tort reform movement can be credited to political influence, power
lobbying and “a campaign of misinformation [that] convinces people that reducing their rights is
actually in their own interest,”40 then there is little room for question that the process behind this
wave of tort reform is undemocratic. As the argument in parts II-IV should make clear,
regressive tort reform is a predictable outcome of the state of our democracy even without the
“campaign of misinformation.” Nonetheless, this campaign of misinformation further erodes the
democratic values of transparency and accountability, making it harder for truly democratic
reforms to gain traction.
To argue that the democratic gains of the 60s and 70s have come undone and that we are
in a stage of consolidating plutocracy must sound radical, or like a conspiracy theory.41 This is,
perhaps, because the average reader of law review articles (law professors, students, lawyers and
the occasional business person or academic from another discipline) thinks he or she does, or
could have, not only a stake in, but a voice in, our political system.42 While this may be true for
some of these readers, it is not true for the majority of Americans.
The idea that we are “the model” of democracy for the world is well entrenched in the
American psyche. We often equivocate having the longest standing written Constitution with the

39

Id.
Id. at 19 See also Lind, supra note 33, at 719; Abel, supra note 33, at 556; Goldberg, supra note 33; Priest, supra
note 33, at 683; Eaton, supra note 33; Witt, supra note 33,
41
The argument that follows does not depend on conspiracy theory nor any “radical” or socialist view of the state or
democracy.
42
It may be particularly difficult for law professors to imagine that they have little voice in American politics (see
part III below on the impact of academics on political responsiveness).
40
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idea that we are one of, if not the, longest established democracies.43 However, our democracy is
very young. In order to rid ourselves of the illusion that we live in a thriving democracy, I will
go into considerable detail to show just how large the gap is between the ‘haves’ and the ‘havenots’ in our political and economic system, as well as how the rising inequality gap is bound up
with losses in socio-economic and political stake, political voice, and losses in political
responsiveness and accountability.44 The spiraling downward pressure of both socio-economic
and political inequality has resulted in unresponsive legislation and policies, including tort
reform, that is contrary to the needs and interests of the majority of Americans. Unlike the tort
reform that helped consolidate our democracy in the 60s and 70s, the tort reform of the last two
decades has acted to further entrench and consolidate oligarchy if not outright plutocracy. At
times I will draw on contrasting trends in Europe to illustrate and support these points.

II

INEQUALITY: ECONOMIC

For a short time, the impact of hurricane Katrina on the people of New Orleans brought
American inequality into sharp relief. As one commentator wrote, “Katrina’s whirlwind has laid
bare the fault lines of race and class in America. For a lightning moment, the American psyche
was singed.”45 There appeared to be some hope that “the shock and shame” of Katrina might
“strip away the old evasions, hypocrisies and not-so-benign neglect” surrounding issues of
43

Thirteen countries extended the franchise to women before the United States.
http://ap.grolier.com/article?assetid=0279670-0&templatename=/article/article.html
44
In spite of the fact that surveys are somewhat biased against those with egalitarian views, Schlozman et al’s
survey results revealed substantial pro-egalitarian sentiments. KAY L. SCHLOZMAN ET. AL., INEQUALITIES OF
POLITICAL VOICE 12-13 (2004), http://www.apsanet.org/imgtest/voicememo.pdf. Those pro-egalitarian sentiments
are much stronger when it comes to the preferences of Americans for political equality than for economic quality.
Id. at 11.
45
Johnathan Tilove, “Our Society is So Uneven”: Katrina Exposes Inequalities of Race, Wealth, TRENTON TIMES,
Sept. 4, 2005, at B1.
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inequality in America.46 The overwhelming racial dimension to the impact of the hurricane no
doubt further accentuated the contrast between the ‘haves’ and the majority of African-American
‘have-nots’. These socio-economic inequalities gave rise to fears of gross political inequality as
significant worries of disenfranchisement abounded in the lead up to the first city elections since
the hurricane, given the large numbers of poor African-Americans who were resettled outside the
city.47 By the time of this publication most Americans will have tired and forgotten about
hurricane Katrina and New Orleans. No doubt most politicians have.
However inconvenient it might be, gross inequality is not limited to New Orleans and
other areas of drastic natural disaster. Inequality is pervasive in our country. As Table 1
illustrates, the statistics on inequality show that among rich western nations we “have the highest
level of inequality by far.48 We have the largest decile ratio gap (the gap between the lowest 10%
in relation to the median income and the highest 10% in relation to the median income)49 and the
highest Gini coefficient gap (the Gini coefficient measures equality across all income
distributions).50 No other economically advanced state approximates our decile ratio and our

46

Jonathan Alter, The Other America, NEWSWEEK, Sept. 19, 2005, at 42-48; Larry Bartels, Is the Water Rising?
Reflections on Inequality and American Democracy, 39 PS: POLITICAL SCIENCE & POLITICS 39 (2006). “Many
Americans were shocked and shamed by the televised images of New Orleans in the wake of Hurricane Katrina….
Thousands of residents, mostly Black and poor, seemed to be trapped in a Hobbesian state of nature, abandoned by
government and civilized society. ” Bartels, supra note 46, at 46.
47
See, e.g. Marc Morano, Voter Disenfranchisement Predicted in New Orleans (March 09, 2006) CNSNews.com
available at:
http://www.cnsnews.com/ViewPolitics.asp?Page=%5CPolitics%5Carchive%5C200603%5CPOL20060309a.html;
Jesse Jackson, Secret rolls undermine N. Orleans vote, CHI. SUN-TIMES, Mar. 7, 2006, available at suntimes.com.
48
Andrea Brandolini & Timothy M. Smeeding, Patterns of Economic Inequality in Western Democracies: Some
Facts on Level and Trends, in 39 PS: POLITICAL SCIENCE & POLITICS 21, 23 (2006); See also Id. at 22, Figure 1.
49
In the U.S. , the numbers were 39% in the bottom 10th percentile and 210 in the top 10th percentile. This means
that the population in the bottom 10% income group receive only 39% of the median income while the top 10%
receive 210% of the median income. This results in a decile ratio in which the top 10% income group receive 5.45
times what the bottom group receives.
50
Id. at 22. The US CIA fact book put the U.S. at 45 for 2004 with a 2004 estimate of 12% of the population below
the poverty line. CIA, THE WORLD FACTBOOK, http://www.cia.gov/cia/publications/factbook/geos/us.html (last
visited June 6, 2006).
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lowest 10% are significantly worse off than their European counterparts.51 Since WWII this gap
has widened at a pace and to a degree unmatched by other economically advanced countries.52

Table 1
Economic Inequality: Lowest 10% compared to medium income; Highest 10% compared to
Medium; the Decile ratio of P90/P10; and the Gini Coefficient.53
COUNTRIES
Luxembourg
2000
Finland 2000
Norway 2000
Sweden 2000
Netherlands 1999
Austria 2000
Switzerland 2000
France 1994
Denmark 1992
Germany 2000
Belgium 2000
Canada 2000
United Kingdom
1999
Italy 2000
Spain 2000
Ireland 2000
United States
2000
Average
Average w/o U.S.

P10
66%

P90
215%

P90/P10 GINI
3.257576 0.26

57%
57%
57%
56%
55%
54%
54%
54%
54%
53%
48%
47%

164%
159%
168%
167%
173%
182%
191%
155%
173%
174%
188%
215%

2.877193
2.789474
2.947368
2.982143
3.1455
3.3704
3.5370
2.8704
3.2037
3.2830
3.9167
4.5745

0.247
0.251
0.252
0.248
0.26
0.28
0.288
0.263
0.252
0.277
0.302
0.345

44%
44%
41%
39%

199%
209%
189%
210%

4.5227
4.75
4.6098
5.3846

0.333
0.34
0.323
0.369

51.76%
52.56%

184%
183%

3.65
3.54

0.287647
0.282563

51

Brandolini & Smeeding, supra note 48, at 22, Figure 1, available at http//www.lisproject.org/keyfigures.
Converting these numbers to a standard curve might bring them into perspective. The standard deviation for the
Decile ratio is 0.812 and thus the US ratio of 5.38 is over 2 standard deviations away from the average of 3.65.The
Gini coefficient is likewise over 2 standard deviations from the average. On the decile score, the U.S. is almost a full
standard deviation away from the next worst group of performing countries (i.e. Spain, Ireland, the U.K. and Italy).
Thus, while these countries are in the C- to D range the U.S. is alone in the F range of the curve.
52
Lawrence Jacobs & Theda Skocpol, Restoring the Tradition of Rigor and Relevance to Political Science, in 39
PS: POLITICAL SCIENCE & POLITICS 27 (2006) (referring to L MISHEL ET. AL, THE STATE OF WORKING AMERICA
(2005)). See also Brandolini & Smeedling, supra note 48, at 25, figures 3 & 4. Jacobs and Skocpol report that as of
2003 the most affluent fifth of the population received 47.6% of family income while the top 5% received 21% of
that income. Jacobs & Skocpol, supra note 21.
53
Brandolini & Smeeding, supra note 48, at 22 Figure 1.
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Stand. Deviation

6.94

19.83

0.812

0.040

The inequality in America is not merely due to market based inequalities but also due to a
lack of intervention to mitigate the inequalities generated by the market.54 As Table 2 shows, the
Market based Gini coefficients between these 13 states and the U.S. do not significantly diverge.
However, market interventions by way of taxes and benefits significantly dampen the disparity
between the rich and poor in most of these countries. The resulting post reduction coefficients
reveal significant disparities between the U.S. and these western countries. While the average
reduction is over 30%, the reduction in the U.S. is about 20%. In those countries where the
reduction percentages approximate our numbers, the pre- benefit Gini coefficient is significantly
lower than our own. For instance, Switzerland’s pre-benefit Gini coefficient is nearly as low as
our post-benefit Gini coefficient.

Table 2
Inequality of Market Income and Disposable Income: Gini Coefficients before and after taxes
and benefits55

Finland
Netherlands
Sweden
Austria
Germany
Belgium
France

Mkt
Gini
38
39
45
43
46
47
49

after ben reducti
on
25
34%
25
36%
25
44%
26
39%
26
42%
28
41%
29
47%

54

Lane Kenworthy & Jonas Pontusson, Rising Inequality and the Politics of Redistribution in Affluent Countries, in
3 PERSPECTIVES ON POL. 449 (2005) available at http://www.u.arizona.edu/~lkenwor/pop2005.pdf (last visited June
13, 2006). This data does not reflect government spending on infrastructure, the military, or the civil and criminal
justice system, which provide a disproportionate benefit to businesses and the wealthy.
55
Table based on data extracted from A Brandolini & T Smeedling Figure 2 (based on the Luxemburg Income
Study). Brandolini & Smeedling, supra note 48, at Figure 2.
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Canada
Switzerland
Ireland
Italy
Spain
United Kingdom
United States
Average

41
39
44
46
47
50
47
44.36

30
30
32
33
34
35
37
29.64%

27%
20%
27%
27%
28%
31%
22%
33.21%

The data on Gini coefficient reduction through taxes and benefits does not include
pensions or the public provisions of services such as education or health care, even though low
or no cost provision of these benefits greatly reduces consumption inequality.56 Because
educational provisions in most states in the U.S. are still based on local property values the
distribution of this service entrenches and exacerbates the above inequalities within the U.S. No
other country finances education in this way.57 There is also a significant gap in the provision of
health care between the U.S. and other O.E.C.D. countries which significantly exacerbates the
disposable income gap.58 This has a significant impact on those who are uninsured or underinsured.59 To bring this home, between 1973 and 2000, the income of the bottom 90% of U.S.
tax payers fell by 7 percent while the income of the top 1% grew by 14 percent.60

56

Kenworthy & Pontusson, supra note 54, at 455.
Allan Odden & William H. Clune, School Finance Systems: Aging Structures in Need of Renovation, 20 EDEC.
EVALUATION & POL'Y ANALYSIS 157, 168-69 (1998). For the intersection of law, race and education see Samuel R.
Lucas & Marcel Paret, Annual Reviews, 1 ANNUAL REV. L. & SOC. SCI. 203 (2005),
http://arjournals.annualreviews.org/eprint/znK7y9nbHQND7hyTuGfb/full/10.1146/annurev.lawsocsci.1.041604.115
931?cookieSet=1. For facts on educational attainment by race SEE KAISER FAMILY FOUNDATION, KAISER FAMILY
FOUNDATION FACT SHEET: YOUNG AFRICAN AMERICAN MEN IN THE UNITED STATES,
http://www.kff.org/minorityhealth/upload/7541.pdf (last visited July 27, 2006).
58
Although we spend twice as much for health care than most O.E.C.D. countries, most of the burden is born by the
private sector. While the average O.E.C.D. country public expenditure on health as a percentage of total spending on
health has consistently been over 70% (1980- 2005), the United States has averaged between 40% and 45% from
1980 to 2005. See OECD Health Data 2006 - Frequently Requested Data: Data on Public Expenditure on Health,
http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/59/49/35529832.xls (last visited July 27, 2006).
59
For information on the uninsured see, KAISER FAMILY FOUNDATION, THE GROWING UNINSURED POPULATION AND
THE HEALTH CARE SAFETY NET, http://www.kff.org/uninsured/profile.cfm. For statistics on provision of health care
by race, see KAISER FAMILY FOUNDATION, supra note 57. Insurance coverage may have a significant impact on law
suits. As Reisman states, “where consumers are heavily insured but manufacturers and sellers go bare, there will be
fewer product liability actions than in a jurisdiction where victims have little coverage but businesses hold large
policies.” Mathias Reisman, Liability for Defective Products at the Beginning of the Twenty-First Century:
57
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Further, contrary to the belief of a majority of Americans, our chances of moving up the
economic ladder are not as good as they were 30 years ago. 61 For instance, sons from the
bottom three quarters of the socio-economic scale were less likely to move up in the 1990s than
had sons in the 1960s.62 What is perhaps more troubling is that household income inequality
increased while those working within the household also increased.63 Without the contribution of
wives, the income of the bottom fifth would have decreased by 13.9% between 1979 and 2000
rather than raising by 7.5%.64

III

DEMOCRACY AND INEQUALITY: BEING HEARD
As early as 1955, Kuznet described the relationship between inequality and economic

development in democratic terms. In that work he stated,

In democratic societies the growing political power of the urban lower-income
groups led to a variety of protective and supporting legislation, much of it aimed
to counteract the worst effects of rapid industrialization and urbanization and to
Emergence of a Worldwide Standard? 51 AM. J. COMP. L. 751, 827 (2003). See also Jane Stapleton, Products
Liability in the United Kingdom: The Myths of Reform, 34 TEX. INT'L L.J. 45, 47 (1999) (“the [British] National
Health Service has in the past operated to relieve most tortfeasors from the costs of their victims' medical
treatment.”).
60
Heather Boushey & Christian E. Weller, Inequality and Household Economic Hardship 5 (United Nations Dep’t
of Econ. & Soc. Affairs, Working Paper No. 18, April 2006).
61
See e.g., Janny Scott & David Leonhardt, Class Matters: Shadowy Lines that Still Divide N.Y. TIMES, May 15,
2005, http://www.nytimes.com/2005/05/15/national/class/OVERVIEWFINAL.html?ex=1273809600&en=2fb756e388191419&ei=5088&partner=rssnyt&emc=rss. The New York Times
poll indicated that over 75% of Americans thought that the chances of moving up the economic ladder were as good
or better than they were 30 years ago. Interactive Graphic, How Class Works,
http://www.nytimes.com/packages/html/national/20050515_CLASS_GRAPHIC/index_03.html.
62
Boushey & Weller, supra note 60, at 6 (citing Earl Wysong, Robert Perrucci, & David Wright, Organizations,
Resources, and Class Analysis: The Distributional Model and the U.S. Class Structure (Ind. U. Working Paper,
2004) (comparing the incomes and occupations of 2,749 fathers and sons from the 1970s to the late 1990s)).
63
Id.
64
Id. The top fifth of incomes was not as heavily impacted by women entering the job market as was the bottom.
Wives in families with children in the bottom fifth increased their working hours by 43.9% as compared to only a
27.4% increase in working hours among wives in the top fifth. Id.
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support the claims of the broad masses for adequate shares of the growing income
of the country.65

However, in recent years lower income groups have failed to secure such protective and
supporting legislation, and the legislation that is on the books has been scaled back, and underenforced,66 leaving the poor and lower income groups to the vicissitudes of the market.67 This
means that either Kuznet was incorrect, or that we are not a democratic society.68
The impact of the gap between the ‘haves’ and have-nots’ on our democracy is explored
in detail in the American Political Science Association task force Reports on Inequality and
American Democracy.69 As two of the authors state:

[The report] concluded that the privileged participate more than others and are
increasingly well organized to press their demands on government. Public
officials, in turn, are much more responsive to the privileged than to average
citizens and the least affluent. Citizens with lower or moderate incomes speak
with a whisper that is lost on the ears of inattentive government officials, while

65

Simon Kuznet, Economic Growth and Income Inequality, 45 AM. ECON. REV. 1, 17 (1955).
One example that resonates with tort reform is the E.E.O.C. See, e.g., Marni Goldberg, Job-Discrimination Claims
Pile Up With Budget Cuts, CHI. TRIBUNE, June 17, 2006, http://www.latimes.com/news/nationworld/nation/la-naeeoc17jun17,1,7666899.story?coll=la-headlines-nation (The claims backlog at the EEOC, which has lost 20% of its
staff since 2001, grew 12% last year resulting in a backlog of over 33,000 claims; the backlog is expected to grow to
48,000 by 2007 while Bush is proposing another 4 million dollar reduction in funding).
67
For instance Bill Clinton’s Welfare Reform of 1996 removed many important features of the U.S. welfare safety
net. See TASK FORCE ON INEQUALITY AND AMERICAN DEMOCRACY, INEQUALITY AND PUBLIC POLICY 14 (2004)
(referenced hereafter as TASK FORCE—HACKER), http://www.apsanet.org/imgtest/feedbackmemo.pdf. As Thomas
Piketty and Emmanuel Saez note in Income Inequality in the United States, 1913-1998, CXVIII THE Q. J. OF ECON.
1, 1-2 (2003), “Kuznet’s curve is widely held to have doubled back on itself, especially in the United States, with the
period of falling inequality observed during the first half of the twentieth century being succeeded by a very sharp
reversal of the trend since the 1970s.”
68
Or, we are in a new industrial revolution (ie the computer revolution ). See Piketty & Saez, supra note 67, at 2,
24.
69
TASK FORCE REPORTS, supra note 21.
66
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the advantaged roar with a clarity and consistency that policymakers readily hear
and routinely follow.70

According to some studies, the poorest 1/3 of Americans have virtually no influence on
national legislation and the bottom 2/3 have less than half the influence of the top 1/3.71 Bartels
summarized his unpublished findings from the 101st congress of 1989 to the 103rd congress of
1994 to show that while there was a good deal of responsiveness to middle and high income
constituents, senators completely ignored constituents in the bottom third economic bracket.72
The figures are stark, with nearly twice as much responsiveness being shown for high income
constituents than for middle income constituents and absolutely no weight given to the lower 1/3
of the population.73 One may have expected that this would hold true for Republican members of
congress, given the stereotype that Republicans are for the rich while Democrats are for the
poor.74 Bartles’ statistics do in fact show that Republicans are nearly twice as responsive to the
views of wealthy constituents as are Democrats.75 While one might expect that Democrats would
spread their responsiveness between the middle and lower income constituent, they in fact split
their responsiveness nearly 50/50 between middle and high income constituents and, like

70

Jacobs & Skocpol, supra note 21, at 27. See also Kay Lehman Schlozman, On Inequality and Political Voice:
Response to Stephen Earl Bennett’s Critique, in 39 PS: POLITICAL SCIENCE & POLITICS 55, 56 (2006) (referring to
SCHLOZMAN ET. AL., supra note 44, at 30-33).
71
Bartels, supra note 46, at 40; See also Stephen Macedo & Christopher Karpowitz, The Local Roots of Inequality,
39 PS: POLITICAL SCIENCE AND POLITICS 59, 60 (2006); Larry M. Bartels, Economic Inequality and Political
Representation (2005) (unpublished manuscript, on file with Princeton University),
www.princeton.edu/~bartels/economic.pdf; Martin Gilens, Public Opinion and Democratic Responsiveness: Who
Gets What they Want from Government? (2003) (unpublished manuscript, on file with Princeton University),
http://www.princeton.edu/~csdp/events/pdfs/Gilens.pdf. See also Martian Gilens, discussing Public Opinion and
Democratic Responsiveness: Who Gets What they Want from Government? at The Center for Study of Democratic
Politics, Princeton University, conference on Global Inequality (Nov. 7-8, 2003).
72
Bartels, supra note 46, at 40.
73
See id. at 40, Figure 1.
74
Although there is some truth to the former assertion, Bartels’ work shows that there is little truth the latter
assertion.
75
Bartels, supra note 71, at 20-24; Tables 4-6 at 44-46 and Figure 3 at 53.
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Republicans, are completely unresponsive to low income constituents.76 This view is supported
by historians of voting and by former democratic cabinet members. As Alexander Keyssar notes
in his work on the history of voting in America, Democrats have spent more energy courting
suburban swing votes and trying to keep Wall Street happy than trying to mobilize the masses of
poor non-voters.77
Bartels also noted that the unpublished work of Martin Gilens supported his finding.78
Gilens has since published his expanded research and the results are even more startling.79
Although he found a moderately strong relationship between what the public wants and what the
government does,80 he also found that when Americans with different income levels had
differing policy preferences the policy outcomes strongly reflected the preferences of the most
affluent but not those of poor or even middle-income Americans.81 Thus, Gilens’ published work
goes much further than questioning whether our democratic system works for the poor to
whether our society can be characterized as democratic at all.
Lawrence Jacobs and Benjamin Page found similar results when it came to U.S. foreign
relations. 82 These authors tested the impact of four different factors on U.S. foreign policy
(public opinion, labor, members of epistemic communities (educators and leaders of private

76

The actual ratio is 54/46, and thus Democrats can boast that they are moderately more the party of the middle
class than of the upper class (Bartels, supra note 71, at 53, Figure 3).
77
KEYSSAR, supra note 10, at 4, 321. Keyssar also refers to the work of Robert Reich, Clinton’s secretary of labor
(ROBERT B. REICH, LOCKED IN THE CABINET (1997)) noting that Reich’s memoirs have a number of references to
the fact that the Clinton administration’s political strategies subordinated social policy to the preferences of Wall
Street. KEYSSAR, supra note 10, at 4, 321.
78
Bartels, supra note 46, at 40; (referring to Gilens, supra note 71).
79
He has almost doubled his data set from 754 to 2000 questions and expanded the years from 1992 to 1998 to
between 1981 and 2002. Martin Gilens, Inequality and Democratic Responsiveness, 69 PUBLIC OPINION
QUARTERLY 778-796 (2005). Note that these years substantially overlap with the Rehnquist Court and with the
beginning of regressive tort reform.
80
He notes, however that even with proposed changes receiving 90% public support there is only a 46% chance the
policy makers will adopt the policy. Gilens, supra note 71, at 786
81
See Gilens, supra note 71, at 788-789.
82
Lawrence R. Jacobs & Benjamin I Page, Who Influences U.S. Foreign Policy?, 99 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 107 (2005).
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foreign policy organizations and think tanks[hereinafter experts]), and business).83 They used
four different types of regression models and found that under the four models, business was by
far the most dominant influence on U.S. foreign policy (across the House, the Senate and the
executive/ administration).84 Public opinion, had virtually no impact,85 and the impact of experts
was dubious.86 It was unclear whether their opinions were causes or effects of the views of
policy makers,87 and how much of their views were the product of the influence of business and
labor.88 If the impact of business and labor, on expert opinions is plugged into their analysis, the
impact of business on foreign policy raises from .52 to just over .70 while the impact of labor
raises from .16 to about .29.89 While labor has some impact, it is still dwarfed by the impact of
business.
The results of this study again bring into question democratic responsiveness and
accountability.90 If public opinion has little to no influence on foreign policy, the real impact of
experts is dubious and business has two to three times the impact of labor, then one must
question the true vitality of our democracy. Given the standards articulated above, these signs of
non-responsiveness and grossly unequal responsiveness threaten democracy conceived in these
terms.91

83

Id. at 110.
Id. at 114-117.
85
Id. at 114, table 1, 115, table 2 and 3, and 116, table 4.
86
Id. at 117, 114, table 1, 115, table 2 and 3, and 116, table 4.
87
Id. at 117.
88
Id. at 119.
89
Id. at 119 and see id. at 120, table 5. For a treatment of this phenomenon in the context of tort reform, see.
FEINMAN, supra note 8, at 175.
90
The authors note that their finding may have troubling normative implications for “adherents to democratic theory
who advocate substantial government responsiveness to the reasoned preferences of citizens.” Id. at 121 (referring to
such adherents as ROBERT DAHL, DEMOCRACY AND ITS CRITICS (1989) and BENJAMIN PAGE & ROBERT SHAPIRO,
THE RATIONAL PUBLIC: FIFTY YEARS OF TRENDS IN AMERICA’S POLICY PREFERENCES (1992).
91
Bartels, supra note 46, at 39.
84
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IV

PARTICIPATION: HAVING NO VOICE

Social scientist have identified voter turnout as the potential cause of both the failure to
alleviate the inequality gap92 and the failure to respond to lower income constituencies.93 Others
have argued that affluence and actual contact with politicians or the lack thereof may be more
significant in determining the responsiveness of politicians to different constituencies.94
According to Kenworthy and Pontusson, the median-voter model predicts that with
increases in market inequality the distance between median and mean income increases (the
mean or average wage goes up more than the wage in the middle, or median wage) and as a
result support for government spending increases and thus the inequality gap is narrowed.95 As
documented above, while the model works in Europe, it has failed in the U.S. How do we
account for the failure? One viable explanation for the why Europe does and we do not close the
gap is voter turnout. In the countries surveyed by Kenworthy and Pontusson the differences in
responsiveness to inequalities roughly track voter turn-out rates.96 In other words, the higher the
voter turnout, the more redistribution from rich to poor.97

A. Voter turnout: the most egalitarian form of political participation

92

Kenworthy & Pontusson, supra note 54, at 456-461, 459 (emphasize added), 462, Figure 9. This is the
contemporary variant of Kuznet’s work cited above. Kuznet, supra note 65.
93
John Griffin & Brian Newman, Are Voters Better Represented, 67 J. POL. 1206 (2005).
94
Bartels, supra note 71, at 26-27.
95
Kenworthy & Pontusson, supra note 65, at 456 (referring to Allan Meltzer & Scott Richard, A Rational Theory of
the Size of Government, 89 J. POL. ECON. 914 (1981).
96
Kenworthy & Pontusson, supra note 54, at 459, 462, Figure 9.
97
Compare table 2, supra at 10 and table 3, infra at 16. The explanation is strengthened in the U.S. case by the data
presented below, which shows that the poor have much lower voter turnout rates than those in the middle class and
above.
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The average voter turnout for elections in the 16 countries in table 3 is about 76%.98
Although the 2004 U.S. national elections saw a somewhat respectable turnout of almost 60%,
that number was unusually high for U.S national elections.99 The average turnout for U.S.
congressional elections from 1945 to 2001 was 48%, which is quite low compared to the
average. The turnout at local elections tends to hover at about 30% and below.100 Statistics
collected by Michael P. McDonald from state elections from 1980-2004 show voter participation
rates from between 47% and 50%.101 Even if state officials are responsive to voters, these
numbers call into question the democratic pedigree of state legislative tort reform.

Table 3 VAP statistics by country
Country

Italy
Belgium
Austria
Sweden
Netherlands
Denmark

VAP
Parliamentary
voter turnout
1945-2001
92%
85%
84%
84%
84%
84%

98

Derived from statistics of averages of voting age population ratios across 169 countries in parliamentary elections
from 1945-2001 compiled by the International Institute for Democratic and Electoral Assistance. Rafael López
Pintor et. al., Voter Turnout Rates From a Comparative Perspective, in VOTER TURNOUT SINCE 1945: A GLOBAL
REPORT 75, 83-84 (2002), http://www.idea.int/publications/vt/upload/Voter%20turnout.pdf. Note that not only are
we significantly below every other country on this list, we rank 139th out the 169 countries in the survey. Id.
99
The U.S. census report puts the number higher because it excludes those people of voting age who are not eligible
to vote like certain immigrants and felons/ ex felons. U.S. Dept. of Com., Econ. and Stat. Admin., U.S. Census
Bureau, Voting and Registration in the November 2004 Election: Population Characteristics 1 (March 2006),
http://www.census.gov/prod/2006pubs/p20-556.pdf (written by Kelly Holder) (Hereafter known as “Census
Bureau—Holder”).
100
Macedo & Karpowitz, supra note 71, at 59-60 (referring to STEPHEN MACEDO ET. AL., DEMOCRACY AT RISK:
HOW POLITICAL CHOICES UNDERMINE CITIZEN PARTICIPATION AND WHAT WE CAN DO ABOUT IT 66 (2005) and
Zoltan Hajnal & Jessica Trounstine, Where Turnout Matters: The Consequences of Uneven turnout in City Politics,
67 J. POL. 515 (2005), as well as others).
101
United States Election Project, Voter Turnout Statistics, Turnout 1980-2006,
http://elections.gmu.edu/Turnout%201980-2006.xls. See also Michael P. McDonald, State Turnout Rates Among
Those Eligible to Vote, 1980-2000, 2 ST. POL. AND POL’Y Q. 1999 (2002).
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Canada
Germany
Norway
Finland
Spain
Ireland
United Kingdom
France
Luxembourg
Switzerland
United States
Average

83%
80%
79%
78%
76%
75%
74%
67%
64%
52%
48%
76%

Writing prior to the 2000 elections, Alexander Keyssar noted that historically, low voter
turnout correlated with class and education and that “the people who are least likely to be content
and complacent (and most likely to need government help) are those who are least likely to
vote.”102 This debunks the idea that Americans don’t vote because they are generally content. He
goes on to state that low voter turnout persists among the same groups to whom the franchise
was limited throughout much of our history, namely, the poor, the young, certain minorities and
those with less education—i.e. the ‘have-nots.’103
These observations were borne out in the 2004 elections. Those in the over $50,000
income bracket had a 77% voter turnout as opposed to those making less than $20,000, who had
a 48% voter turnout.104 The poor were greatly overrepresented among non-voters while those
making over $100,000 a year are greatly underrepresented among non-voters. 105 The employed
had a 66% turnout as opposed to a 50% turnout for the unemployed.106 Those with Bachelor’s

102

KEYSSAR, supra note 10, at 321.
Id. The notable exception is women. Census Bureau—Holder, supra note 113, at 2.
104
Census Bureau—Holder, supra note 99, at 5. The income based statistics stop at $100,000 and over and so it is
difficult to know what the numbers are like for the very wealthy.
105
Id. at 10, table C.
106
Id. at 5.
103
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degrees had about twice the voter turnout as those without high school degrees (78% vs. 40%).107
Those in the 18-24 year old bracket who do not have a high school degree had a rate of under
25% while those in the same bracket with college degrees had a 67% rate.108 Non-Hispanic white
citizens had turnout rates at 67% while black citizens were at 60%, Hispanic citizens at 47% and
Asian citizens at 44%.109
As one might predict, the increase in voter turnout for the 2004 election was not due to
higher turnout rate from Blacks, Asians, Hispanics or from the poor, but from non-Hispanic
whites who increased their turnout from 60.5% in 2000 to 67% in 2004 and those making over
$50,000 per year who increased their turnout from 72% in 2000 to 77% in 2004.110
As noted above, voter turnout has also been used to explain the closely related
phenomenon of a lack of responsiveness. Griffin and Newman found that voters are better
represented than non-voters.111 Given that the middle and upper income groups have better voter
turnout rates than the poor this may account for at least some of the difference in responsiveness.
There is a whole host of explanations for why certain minorities, the poor, and uneducated have
such low voter turnouts. Those explanations include:
•

lack of stake in the system (little to gain), 112

•

the complex non-user-friendly procedures,113
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Id.
Id. at 6.
109
Id. at 7.
110
Compare Census Bureau—Holder, supra note 99 with U.S. Dept. of Com., Econ. and Stat. Admin., U.S. Census
Bureau, Voting and Registration in the November 2000 Election: Population Characteristics 3, 5 (Feb. 2002),
http://www.census.gov/prod/2002pubs/p20-542.pdf. (written by Jamieson, et. al.) (Here after known as “Census
Bureau—Jamieson, et. al.).
111
Griffin & Newman, supra note 93.
112
Clinton’s own secretary of labor said that “the great mass of non-voters … didn’t vote in 1996 because they saw
nothing in it for them.” REICH, supra note 77, at 330.
113
KEYSSAR, supra note 10, at 321; see also MARTIN WATTENBERG, WHERE HAVE ALL THE VOTERS GONE? 162
(2002). Wattenberg finds it impressive how good our turnout is given how complicated our process is compared to
other countries. Id.
108

25

•

conflicts with work, school or childcare obligations,114

•

the fact that voting is not mandatory,115 and

•

the fact that we have a two party system, under which neither party caters to the interests
of the poor.116

If elected officials were concerned about the groups that have such low voter turnout, a
number of simple reforms would make it easier to go to the polls. As common sense suggests,
given that those who do not vote did not elect the people currently in office, there is not much
incentive for those in office to enact reforms to bring them to the polls.117
Setting aside the problems created by our two party system,118 which would be difficult,
both practically and politically, to change, many other changes would be simple, for instance:
making ballets less complicated,119 making elections mandatory,120 making election day a
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This is because our elections are held during the work week and not on a public holiday. See WATTENBERG,
supra note 113, at 169-71. Wattenberg notes that in President Clinton’s last official message to Congress he wrote,
“We should declare election day a national holiday so that no one has to choose between their responsibilities at
work and their responsibilities as a citizen.” Id. at 170-71 (citing William Jefferson Clinton, 42th President of the
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115
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KEYSSAR, supra note 10, at 321. As he further notes, Clinton’s own secretary of labor said that “the great mass of
non-voters … didn’t vote in 1996 because they saw nothing in it for them.” Id. See also REICH, supra note 77, at
330.
117
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See e.g. AREND LIJPHART, PATTERS OF DEMOCRACY: GOVERNMENT FORMS AND PERFORMANCE IN THIRTY-SIX
DEMOCRACIES (1999); see also Pippa Norris, Choosing Electoral Systems: Proportional, Majoritarian and Mixed
Systems, 18 INT’L POL. SCI. REV. 297 (1997) (Special issue: Contrasting Political Institutions), available at
http://www.cuhk.edu.hk/gpa/wang_files/Dem09.pdf.
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easier to complete. WATTENBERG, supra note 113, at 166.
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See Pintor, et. al., supra note 98; see also WATTENBERG, supra note 113, at 164; and Arend Lijphart, Unequal
Participation: Democracy’s Unresolved Dilemma, 91 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 1 (1997). Note that compulsory voting
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national holiday,121 putting it on a weekend,122 or simply extending the hours.123 These would
significantly improve democratic participation.

B. Other more stratified forms of political participation

Bartles tested the hypothesis that voter turnout was the cause of lack of responsiveness
along with a few other contenders, e.g., ‘political knowledge’ and ‘contact with senators and/or
staff’ and found the latter (contact with senators and/or staff) to have the most significant impact
on responsiveness.124 By comparing his work with Sidney Verba’s, he was also able to roughly
test the hypothesis that campaign contributions impacted on responsiveness, and found that in
two of the eight issue areas the projected disparities in responsiveness matched the disparities in
income contribution while in the others, the disparities did not quite match the dollar for dollar
disparities although, unsurprisingly, they did tend in the same direction.125
Despite low voter turnout rates, voters are the most numerous and most representative
group of political activists.126 At the other end of the representative spectrum are campaign
contributors, who are the least representative.127 85% of those making a donation to a
presidential candidate of over $1,000 had at least a BA, and 95% of the substantial donors to
presidential candidates in 2000 made over $100,000.128 The race, sex and age discrepancies in
donations of over $200 to presidential candidates reflect similar discrepancies, with 96% of
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WATTENBERG, supra note 113, at 170-71.
Id.at 169.
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Bartels, supra note 71, at 24-29, 47, Table 7.
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donations coming from Whites, 70% coming from males and over 99% of donations coming
from those over 30. Those in the 18-30 bracket contributed only 1% while those over age 46
contributed 83%.129
Looking across the spectrum of participation, the statistics show that those making over
$75,000 per year are between two and six times more likely to participate in politics through
campaign work, direct contact, protests, affiliation with political organizations, informal
community activities, and campaign contributions than those making under $75,000 per year.130
Those making over $75,000 per year have approximately twice as much direct contact as those
making under $75,000 per year. The numbers are not as drastic for race, but they do show
significant disparities between Whites, African Americans and Latinos.131 The discrepancy in
political activity between those in the 18-24 age range and those in the ranges of 24-49 and 5059 was about 1-2.132
Education, is a central element in the relationship between socio-economic status and
participation because it affects many other determinants of socio-economic status as well as the
other determinants of participation, e.g. job, income, knowledge, civic and organizational skills,
as well as connections with other politically active people who are more likely to enlist their aid
in political activities.133
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Id. at 38 table 3.
Id. at 23, Figure 1. Class based stratification affects the entire range of political activities. KEYSSAR, supra note
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the ground or keeping it going.” SCHLOZMAN ET. AL., supra note 44, at 20.
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Gilens, supra note 71,at 24, Table 2. See also Id. at 24, Figure 3. In terms of mean number of political activities
Anglo-White men had 2.36 compared to 1.94 for Black men and 1.61 for Latino men. Among women, Whites had
2.08, Black’s 1.86, and Latinas .9. Id.
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Given the growing inequality in America, the low voter turnout among the poor and
uneducated, the lack of access of middle and lower income Americans to politicians, and the
resulting lack of influence on “representatives” it is not surprising that legislation in general, and
tort reform in particular, would not tend to the needs and preferences of a majority of Americans.

C. Disenfranchised citizens (Illegal Americans)134

Since 1975, incarceration rates in the United States have quadrupled and over 5.3 million
felons and ex felons are prohibited from voting.135 2.5% of the general population is denied the
vote.136 The demographics for the prison population significantly overlap with those in society
who have low voter turnout and low political participation in general. Richard Freeman of
Harvard University and the National Bureau of Economic Research reports that the prison
population is disproportionately black and young with low education and literacy levels.137

College Admissions 10-11, 69, Table 1.1 (Century Foundation, Paper, March 2003), available at
http://www.tcf.org/Publications/Education/carnevale_rose.pdf . Carnevale and Rose found that “74 percent of the
students at the top 146 highly selective colleges came from families in the top quarter of the SES scale (as measured
by combining family income and the education and occupations of the parents), just 3 percent came from the bottom
SES quartile, and roughly 10 percent came from the bottom half of the SES scale. If attendance at these institutions
reflected the population at large, 85,000 students (rather than 17,000) would have been from the bottom two SES
quartiles.” Id. 11.
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I use the term “illegal American” because it tracks the pejorative term “illegal immigrant.” It is a way marking
them as “illegal” rather than as, say, hard working exploited immigrants. We do not usually label people as “illegal”
when they break the law and do not usually talk about the “illegal employer” problem in America. Felony
disenfranchisement, particular post-release, is a way of marking people as outlaws or second class citizens.
135
Manza and Uggen put the number at 5.3 million with 39% having completed their sentences. JEFF MANZA &
CHRISTOPHER UGGEN, LOCKED OUT: FELON DISENFRANCHISEMENT AND AMERICAN DEMOCRACY 77 (2006). See
also KATHERINE I PETTUS, FELONY DISENFRANCHISEMENT IN AMERICA: HISTORICAL ORIGINS, INSTITUTIONAL
RACISM, AND MODERN CONSEQUENCES (2005). As of June 2005, there were 4.8 people incarcerated out of every
1,000, that is almost one out of very 200 people. U.S. Department of Justice, Bureau of Justice Statistics, Prison
Statistics (2005), http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/bjs/prisons.htm. The percentages for Black males at the end of 2004
was over 3% compared to white males at less than .05% of their population. Id.
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LALEH ISPAHANI, ACLU, OUT OF STEP WITH THE WORLD: AN ANALYSIS OF FELONY DISENFRANCHISEMENT IN
THE U.S. AND OTHER DEMOCRACIES 3 (May 2006), http://www.aclu.org/images/asset_upload_file825_25663.pdf.
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Richard Freeman, Can We Close the Revolving Door? Recidivism vs. Employment of Ex-Offenders in the U.S.4
(The Urban Inst. Reentry Roundtable Discussion Paper No. 2 2003), available at
http://www.ssw.umich.edu/events/CASD/freeman.pdf.
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Information on released prisoners indicates that 14% have less than 8 years of schooling and
67% have less than high school.138 Nearly half of the prison population consists of black males
and 68% of all prisoners are below the age of 34.139
Ex offenders do not do well in the job market. They have low employment rates and they
tend to earn less than others with similar demographics140 Further, nearly one third have a
physical impairment or mental condition and 21% have some physical or mental condition that
impairs work ability.141 As Freeman states, “Since persons with physical and mental health
problems, limited education, and poor literacy do badly in the US job market independently of a
criminal record, [it should come as no surprise that] ex-offenders fare poorly in the job
market.”142 It should also come as little surprise that under these conditions, most prisoners end
up back in prison.143
The felon/ ex-felon, is a distinct, insular and growing minority in our society. Although
they represent an extreme case, their disenfranchisement is compounded by the fact that they
have very little mobility, very little stake, and even less say in the future of our society.144
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http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/bjs/pub/pdf/rpr94.pdf).
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http://pewhispanic.org/files/reports/46.pdf. Unauthorized immigrants provide a cheep, hard working and docile
labor force. Their presence keeps authorized immigrants and U.S. citizens relatively docile while keeping their
wages low. They also provide a scapegoat for our woes and threats to our security, even though they put much more
into our economy than they take out (including social security and taxes) and there have been few if any terrorists
threats coming from unauthorized immigrants, especially from Mexico. The nineteen 9/11 terrorists entered the
country legally. 9/11 COMMISSION REPORT 27 (2004).
139

30

Looking at the phenomenon comparatively, we incarcerate between 5 and 8 times the
number of people incarcerated in other advanced industrial nations.145 The overwhelming
majority of Western European states have no ban on voting at all,146 or only ban voting for
specific criminals who commit certain serious crimes, and usually as explicit additional aspects
of their prison sentence.147 While some twelve European states completely ban voting for
incarcerated prisoners,148 ten of these twelve states are former Eastern Bloc countries who have a
history of limited enfranchisement.149 Of the two Western European countries, Spain and the
United Kingdom, Spain rarely disenfranchises its prisoners,150 and the practice of blanket bans in
the United Kingdom has recently been condemned by the European Court of Human Rights in
Hirst v. United Kingdom (No 2).151 Further, while some countries disqualify ex-felons from
voting, “the sanction is purposefully and narrowly targeted, and the number of disenfranchised
people is probably in the dozens or hundreds. In the United States, the disqualification is
automatic, pursues no defined purpose and affects millions.”152
Not only has the European Court of Human Rights condemned practices like that in the
U.S., but so has the Supreme Court of Israel,153 the Supreme Court of Canada,154 and the
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Constitutional Court of South Africa.155 These countries recognize that denying prisoners the
right to vote is not undesirable merely because it harms the individual who loses the right, but
because it harms the democratic legitimacy of the state. As McLachlin CJ, writing for the
majority in Sauvé v. Canada said:

The right of all citizens to vote, regardless of virtue or mental ability or other
distinguishing features, underpins the legitimacy of Canadian democracy and
Parliament’s claim to power. A government that restricts the franchise to a select
portion of citizens is a government that weakens its ability to function as the
legitimate representative of the excluded citizens, jeopardises its claims to
representative democracy, and erodes the basis of its right to convict and punish
lawbreakers.156

Denying prisoners the right to vote, particularly after they have served their time makes it
clear that some people simply do not count, and are not a part of the same “democratic” America
that the rest of us are. This is particularly troubling given that this class is greatly
overrepresented by minorities, those who are economically disadvantaged, educationally
deprived and who have mental and physical disabilities. Taking away this right sends the
message that these people are second class citizens, in effect, “illegal Americans.”

in a democracy flows from the citizens, it is difficult to see how that power can legitimately be used to
disenfranchise the very citizens from whom the government’s power flows.” Id. at para 32).
155
National Institute of Crime Prevention and the Re-Integration of Offenders (NICRO), Erasmus and Schwagerl v.
Minister of Home Affairs (CCT 03/04 2004) (striking down the Electoral Laws Amended Act 34 of 2003, which
denied the right to vote for those serving prison sentences that did not have the option of a fine); August and
Another v Electoral Commission and Others (CCT 8/99 1999) (holding that the Electoral Commission, by not
providing the means and mechanisms for prisoners to vote, had breached the prisoner’s rights to vote under the
Constitution).
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Sauvé v. Canada [2002] 3 S.C.R. 519, para 34.
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V. TORT “REFORM”

Jay Feinman links the current wave of tort “reform” to a systematic campaign to unmake
the common law.157 Feinman traces the campaign to Ronald Regan’s inaugural address, where he
stated that “Government is not the solution to our problems; government is the problem.”158
Although this might not sound like an agenda to un-make the common law, the undoing of
some100 years of common law developments is an integral part of this rather comprehensive
view of the role of government in democracy. The idea is a return to a time of minimal
governmental interference with the market (laissez faire capitalism) and with it pre-modern or
classical legal thought under which judges are mere neutral referees, rather than guardians of
justice. Here, individual negative rights embodying such notions as ‘freedom of contract’ and
‘buyer beware’ trump public policy embodying ideas such as corporate responsibility and
consumer safety, or taking measures to ensure that people actually are free.
Feinman makes three main points concerning the “Right’s” attack on the common law.
“First, the law has dramatically changed to the detriment of ordinary people.”159 Second, the
various individual developments in contract, property and tort law are part of a comprehensive,
coordinated campaign,160 “by an army of corporations, foundations, lobbyists, litigation centers,
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think tanks politicians and academics.”161 And third, the campaign is not conservative but is
radical in its rejection of developments in the law over the last one hundred years.162 Feinman
describes a campaign that is designed to take us back to the thoroughly discredited “classical
theory” of the laissez faire Lochner era.163
Feinman, like others, makes the point that the tort reform campaign is based on
misinformation, if not lies.164 As Feinman states, “The problem with the conservative campaign,
however, is that it is false. Not debatable, or a matter of opinion or political viewpoint, but
false.”165 Its falsity is based in many little lies that exaggerate cases, overstate the amount of and
the effect of frivolous lawsuits, the impact of regulations on property rights and as well as the
impact of liberal adjudication on the sanctity of contract.166 When combined they feed into the
big lie that the common law has been hijacked by greedy plaintiffs and lawyers as well as by
liberal activist judges.167
Although tort reform is not the only area of law that is bound up with our democratic
deficit, as Feinman notes, “The longest-running front in the … campaign to reshape the common
law has played out in …what lawyers call “tort law.””168 Given the data and arguments put forth
above in parts II-IV, one does not need to be a conspiracy theorist to predict that a well
Further, one fourth of all federal judicial candidates for under the second Bush administration were recommended by
the Federalist society and most of the lawyer’s in the White House Counsel’s office have been active members. Id at
189.
161
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(citing the TORT POLICY WORKING GROUP, REPORT OF THE TORT POLICY WORKING GROUP ON THE CAUSES, EXTENT
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organized and funded campaign to institute reform for the ‘haves’ by the ‘haves’ in the area of
tort law would be successful even if it was not good for most Americans. The pervasive
disinformation that accompanied this movement has no doubt acted like grease on a pig for those
fighting against these “reforms” while acting like grease on the cogs of the machine for those
pushing the reforms.
I will first briefly canvass both the main achievements in democratic tort reform as well
as the recent retrenchment of some of those achievements along with other regressive changes in
tort law. I will then look at the role of the Supreme Court in tort reform to show the
unprecedented extent to which that institution has engaged in an area generally considered the
domain of the states, their courts and Congress, to the detriment of the people and of democracy.
Before doing so, it might be good to respond to a preliminary challenge. One may argue
that since the bulk of progressive tort reform during the 60s and 70s was judicially created and
most of the tort reform since the 1980s is legislative, the latter trend of regressive tort reform
must have a better democratic pedigree than the former. This is dubious for at least two reasons.
First, it is by no means settled that the bulk of progressive tort reform in the former period was
judicial (see part V.A. below). More importantly, given the evidence above that our traditional
“democratic” institutions (the executive and legislative branches) are skewed, or corrupted from
the perspective of democratic values, then it follows that courts, which are generally insulated
from interest group power politics and which are required to justify their decisions to the public
through written decisions, may have a better chance of delivering decisions that are
democratically justifiable. This is particularly true in the area of personal injury tort law where
by and large the plaintiff class is unorganized and under funded, and the defendant class is well

35

organized and well funded.169 Potential victims have neither the motive nor the easy means for
organizing. Most people do not think of themselves as potential plaintiffs and thus are not
generally mobilized to press their concerns, while most businesses and their associations do
factor in the potential of being a defendant and thus, they have both the motive and the means to
press their interests in tort reform through experts, lobbying, and campaign contributions.170
Abel also notes that the plaintiff’s bar does not necessarily have the interests of plaintiff’s in
mind in its battle with the defense bar over tort reform, for instance when it comes to no-fault
automobile compensation schemes. 171
One way around the lack of influence in the judicial sphere is by contracting out of court
and into arbitration where businesses, particularly businesses that are repeat players have a
distinct advantage.172 The other tactic is try to break down the barriers that insulate courts as
much as possible, and this takes place in part through concerted efforts to get pro-tort reform
judges elected and appointed. For instance, the movement to dismantle strict liability in products
cases in California came after 1986 when three liberal judges were voted off the bench and
replaced with conservatives.173 Of course, the politicization of the judiciary took off under
former President Reagan.174 As David Law notes “commentators have singled out Reagan for
taking the politicization of the judiciary to new heights by implementing a centralized high-level
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process for the ideological vetting of judicial candidates.”175 According to Goldman, Reagan was
very successful in appointing circuit court justices that remained faithful to his conservative
agenda.176 This has been reinforced ever since by the active participation of conservative groups
in the process of judicial nominations.177

A. Tort Reform in General

1. Progressive democratic tort reform

Democracy reinforcing reform of tort law began in the early 1900s when workmen’s
compensation schemes started to spread. The schemes were the clearest and earliest examples of
trying to find collective justice for a group of people who were severely disadvantaged by the
extant rules of the tort system.178 Other than workmen’s compensation and Cordozo’s opinion in
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want more confirmations before the November elections in case the GOP loses Senate seats.).
178
The extant rules included such defenses as the fellow servant exception to master servant liability, voluntary
assumption of risk, and contributory negligence. See ARTHUR LARSON, 1-2 LARSON'S WORKERS' COMPENSATION
LAW §§ 2.03, 2.07-2.08 (2005), http://www.lexis.com. Some courts did temper these defenses in the late 1800s and
early 1900s allowing more workers to gain compensation, however the bulk of workers injured on the job were left
without compensation or with very little compensation. Id. at § 2.04, 2.07. See also part V. infra. See LARSON,
supra note 177, at §4, 7. These were also years of progress for the women’s suffrage movement. Note that
women’s rights to tort compensation was also limited from the 1800s to the modern period. See Rustad & Koenig,
supra note 17, at 34-35. See also Margo Schlanger, Injured Women Before Common Law Courts: 1860- 1930, 21
HARV. WOMEN’S L.J. 79 (1998).
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MacPherson v. Buick Motor Co., not much reform took place until the “Democratic
Expansionary Era" after the Second World War.179
This period saw the court moving from a view of the tort system as case by case
corrective justice to a view of the system as a mechanism for collective justice, or providing
justice across classes of cases.180 This is partially what allowed the courts to think not only of
putting people back into the place they were before the tort, but of other social goals like
deterring wrongs and providing incentives for manufacturers to make their products safer for
society.181 Courts stopped merely accepting that the status quo distributions of power and wealth
were just and tailored corrective justice to collective and distributive justice concerns.
Democratic developments during the era resulted in the removal of immunity at both the
federal level and the state level.182 It began with the Federal Tort Claims Act 1946 28 U.S. §
2875 and most states followed with similar legislation, opening up their court for suits, thus
making the state and the people equal before the law.183 The 1960s saw the 1964 Civil Rights
Act which provided statutory tort actions for discrimination in employment, housing,
educational, or public accommodations on the basis of race, sex, national origin, or religion.184
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Macpherson v. Buick Motor Co., 11 N.E. 1050, 1051-55 (N.Y. 1916) (holding that Buick owed a duty of care to
the ultimate purchaser despite the absence of privity); Rustad & Koenig, supra note 17, at 38
180
FEINMAN, supra note 8, at 53 (Feinman puts the starting date at 1920). The previous era (the late 1800s to early
1900s) is often recognized as an era where the compensatory function of tort law was actually constricted. EDWARD
WHITE, TORT LAW IN AMERICA: AN INTELLECTUAL HISTORY 61 (1980).
181
There of course is the challenge that this should be left to legislators to decide. Cf. Abel, supra note 33.
182
Sovereign immunity from suit was abandoned in France by 1905. The first case to undermine the doctrine
occurred in 1873 with the Tribunal des Conflicts cases of l’arrêt Blanco TC 8 Feb 1873, D.1873.17 (according
jurisdiction to the administrative courts for actions brought against the state for damages caused by actions of
persons employed in the public service) and the doctrine was solidified by 1905 in the case of Tomaso Grecco, CE
10 Feb 1905, D.1906.3.81. See DUNCAN FAIRGRAVE, STATE LIABILITY IN TORT: A COMPARATIVE STUDY 12-13
(2001).
183
See FEINMAN, supra note 8, at 56-57; DAN DOBBS, THE LAW OF TORTS §268 (2001). England also followed suit
in 1947 with the Crown Proceedings Act of 1947, although vestiges of immunity still exist. FAIRGRAVE, supra note
182, at 12, 14-16.
184
42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-2000e-17 (2001) (Equal Employment Opportunities).
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Developments came in the area of consumer protection and products liability,185 which were
crystallized in the Restatement Second of Torts in 1965.186 Comparative fault did not begin to
overtake the draconian rule/ defense of contributory negligence (which in many cases completely
barred a plaintiff from bringing a claim if she was at all negligent) until the 1970s.187 The general
no duty rule in torts (the rule that we are not responsible for others and have no positive duties
towards them) was also narrowed during the 1970s when courts started imposing duties on
people in “special relations” with others (e.g. psychiatrists and patients, common carriers and
passengers, schools and their pupils, landlords and tenant, and business and their customers).188
These reforms helped consolidate democracy by providing enforcement mechanisms for hard
won democratic rights as well as by making it easier for those whose rights had been violated to
access the justice system and vindicate those rights.
2. Regressive tort reform

As noted above, Feinman identified the Tort Policy Working Group from the Ronald
Reagan-Edwin Meese justice department, as one of the main catalysts of the tort reform
movement.189 That group identified a number of causes of the “liability insurance crisis,”190 and
a set of recommendations or strategies for attacking that “crisis.” They summarily excluded all
other explanations besides the civil justice system and thus unsurprisingly their
recommendations or strategies focused only on attacking that system, by:
185

Greenman v. Yuba Power Products, Inc., 377 P.2d 897 (Cal. 1962). See also FEINMAN, supra note 8, at 55-56.
Rustad and Koenig note a whole range of progressive decisions by the California courts during this era. Rustad &
Koenig, supra note, 17 at 45-49.
186
Restatement (Second) of Torts § 402A (1965).
187
Nockleby & Curreri, supra note 1, at 1069-70.
188
Id. at 1065-69.
189
FEINMAN, supra note 8, at 25.
190
The decline of fault as the basis for liability, the undermining of causation, the explosive growth in damage
awards, and the high transaction costs of the system. Id. at 26.
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1) making it harder for injury victims to get into court,
2) making it more difficult to win once they are there, and
3) restricting damage recoveries for plaintiffs who do win.191

This, in perhaps oversimplified terms, has guided the tort reform movement ever since.192

a. Keeping plaintiffs out of court.

How do you keep plaintiffs out of court? You make it less attractive for lawyers to take
the cases, by putting limits on contingency fees, 193 or through “early offer” mechanisms (which
include attorney fee limits) for economic damages which would preclude or make it very
difficult to receive non-economic damages like pain and suffering.194 Or you can make it
difficult for states to hire attorneys for complex litigation (e.g. tobacco and gun cases).195 And
finally, you can make it harder for people to join together in class actions.196 This has been done
in part through the Class Action Fairness Act of 2005 which takes many class actions out of the
state courts and puts them into the federal courts.197 The "federalization" of class actions may act
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Id. at 25, 27.
Id. Note, the structure of this overview follows the structure of FEINMAN, supra note 8, at 27-46, but is not
limited to its substance.
193
Id. at 27-28.
194
Id. at 29-30.
195
Id. at 30-31.
196
Id. at 31-32.
197
Pub. L. No. 109-2, 119 Stat. 4 (2005) (to be codified at 28 U.S.C. §§ 1332(d), 1335(a)(1), 1453, 1603(b)(3),
1711-15). The literature on the act is already quite extensive. See e.g., Robert H. Klonoff & Mark Herrmann,
Symposium: Class Actions in the Gulf South and Beyond, The Class Action Fairness Act: An Ill-Conceived
Approach to Class Settlements, 80 TUL. L. REV. 1695 (2006); see id. at 1996, footnote 1 for an extensive list of
academic commentary on the Act (forty plus pieces). As Klonoff and Herrmann state, “It is well known that under
CAFA, most major class actions, including virtually all multistate class actions, will now be heard in federal court.”
Id. at 1696.
192
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to deny or impede plaintiff's access to justice for in a number of reasons,198 including the relative
difficulty of certifying classes in federal courts,199 and the fact that the federal courts are
overcrowded and appeals may cause undue delay.200 Further, to the extent that Republicans have
managed to take over the federal judiciary and/or to secure anti-litigation justices on the federal
bench, one would expect more bias against plaintiffs in general and against class actions in
particular.201 As we will see below, access to courts can also be limited through the enforcement
of arbitration agreements that often preclude class actions,202 and that, by definition, limit access
to the courts, both in the first instance and as a matter of review.

b. Making it harder for plaintiff to win cases

The other more direct route is to change the liability rules to make it harder for plaintiffs
to win when they get to court. This has happened in the case of making strict liability less strict
in products liability cases,203 setting up procedural obstacles in medical malpractice cases,204 and
198

Allan Kanner, Interpreting the Class Action Fairness Act in a Truly Fair Manner, 80 TUL. L. REV. 1645, 1654
(2006).
199
The federal courts' reluctance to issue class certification is well documented (referring to S. Rep. No. 106-420, at
57-59 (2000) (noting minority senators' views on CAFA)) (noting also that a review of forty-three class action cases
involving life insurance marketing practices found that cases were nearly twice the certification in state court as in
federal court) (referring to Public Citizen, Unfairness Incorporated: The Corporate Campaign Against Consumer
Class Actions 85 (June 2003), http:// www.citizen.org/documents/ACF2B13.pdf).
200
Kanner, supra note 198, at 1654. For the view that class actions are undemocratic because they have led to
substantive changes in the law, which did not go through the legislative process, see Martin H. Redish, Class
Actions and the Democratic Difficulty: Rethinking the Intersection of Private Litigation and Public Goals, 2003 U.
CHI. LEGAL F. 71 (2003).
201
For an account of the Republican efforts to appoint conservatives to the bench since Reagan see, e.g., Law, supra
note 27, at 485-86 (noting that Reagan succeeded in making ideological considerations paramount: by one observer's
count, over three-quarters of his circuit court appointees furthered his conservative agenda, with the balance
appearing to reward the party faithful. Id. at 490.
202
See part V.B.4 infra.
203
See FEINMAN, supra note 8, at 34-40. See part V infra. In fact the move is to return certain forms of products
liability to a negligence standard.
204
See, e.g., Thomas Baker who, commenting on the effect of the Harvard Medical Malpractice Study (HMPS),
notes that “policymakers have seized on the weakest aspect of the HMPS, the analysis of the validity of medical
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by providing immunity from suit for certain industries.205 This has been the case with gun
manufacturers206 as well as biomaterials manufacturers.207
c. Capping damages and making punitive damages harder to get.

Finally, one of the most active areas of tort reform has centered around limiting damages,
and this has happened by placing limits on joint and several liability,208 limiting the collateral
source rule,209 and non-economic damage caps,210 including not only limits on punitive
damages,211 but also limits on pain and suffering damages. 212 In addition to placing caps on

malpractice claims, and used that analysis to justify imposing caps on damages in medical malpractice cases and
additional procedural hurdles for medical malpractice claimants. For that reason the practical impact of the HMPS
may well have been to expand the gap between the large number of people who are injured by medical malpractice
and the few people who are compensated and to increase the likelihood that the compensation that is received will
be inadequate.” Thomas Baker, Reconsidering the Harvard Medical Malpractice Study: Conclusions About the
Validity of Medical Malpractice Claims, 33 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 501, 511 (2005).
205
This also echoes the reinvigorated state immunity doctrine of the Supreme Court. See V.B.5 infra.
206
FEINMAN, supra note 8 at 33; Daniel Feldman, Legislating or Litigating Public Policy Change: Gunmaker Tort
Liability 12 VA. J. SOC. POL'Y & L. 140 (2004); But see the repeal of immunity in California, John Fowler, Will a
Repeal of Gun Manufacturer Immunity from Civil Suits Untie the Hands of the Judiciary? 34 MCGEORGE L. REV.
339 (2003).
207
FEINMAN, supra note 8, at 33 - 34. See also James D. Kerouac, Note, A Critical Analysis of the Biomaterials
Access Assurance Act of 1998 as Federal Tort Reform Policy, B.U. J. SCI. & TECH. L. 327 (2001).
208
See, e.g., the National Association of Mutual Insurance Companies’ report on Joint and Several Liability Rule
Reform. NAT’L ASS’N OF MUT. INS. COS., JOINT AND SEVERAL LIAB. REFORM STATES,
http://www.namic.org/reports/tortReform/JointAndSeveralLiability.asp (last visited July 27, 2006).
209
See NAT’L ASS’N OF MUT. INS. COS., COLLATERAL SOURCE RULE REFORM,
http://www.namic.org/reports/tortReform/CollateralSourceRule.asp (last visited July 27, 2006). Note that according
to Kevin S. Marshall and Patrick W. Fitzgerald, forty-four states have enacted legislation allowing for the
consideration of the payment of collateral source benefits. Kevin S. Marshall & Patrick W. Fitzgerald, The
Collateral Source Rule and Its Abolition: An Economic Perspective, 15 KAN. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 57, 61 (2005) ( See
Appendix I) (arguing that tort reform designed to undermine the collateral source rule is the product of defense
oriented public interest group lobbying and has resulted in arbitrary wealth transferring legislation that not only
undermines the legitimate purposes of tort law, namely, compensation, indemnity, restitution and deterrence, but is
economically unsound).
210
See, e.g., NAT’L ASS’N OF MUT. INS. COS., NON-ECONOMIC DAMAGE REFORM,
http://www.namic.org/reports/tortReform/NoneconomicDamage.asp (last visited July 27, 2006).
211
See, e.g., NAT’L ASS’N OF MUT. INS. COS., PUNITIVE DAMAGE REFORM,
http://www.namic.org/reports/tortReform/PunitiveDamage.asp (last visited July 27, 2006).
212
See, e.g., FEINMAN, supra note 8, at 40-46. Medical malpractice reform is one very significant area of regressive
reform. Nockleby & Curreri believe that reform efforts in this area can be traced to the abandonment of the locality
rule of practice which undermined the "conspiracy of silence" by holding doctors to a national standard of care.
Nockleby & Curreri, supra note 1, at 1023, Part III.B.2.
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punitive damages, tort reform has also included increasing the burden of proof on the plaintiff in
order to receive punitive damages.213 As Michael L. Rustad explains,

Forty-five out of the fifty-one jurisdictions either do not recognize punitive
damages or have enacted one or more restrictions on the remedy since 1979.
These reforms include capping punitive damages, bifurcating the amount of
punitive damages from the rest of the trial, raising the burden of proof, allocating
a share of punitive damages to the state, and restricting use of evidence of
corporate wealth. The handful of jurisdictions that have yet to enact tort reforms
are mostly punitive damages cold spots rather than tort hellholes.214

All of these mechanisms undermine achievements from the 60s and 70s which made it
easier for relatively week and unorganized victims to organize and to access justice to vindicate
their rights. They undermine the deterrent effects of tort law designed to keep consumers safe
and hold those who profit from placing dangerous products into the stream of commerce
responsible for those products. These changes benefit the few at the expense of the majority of
Americans.
d. Illegal Americans revisited

213

See, e.g,. JACOB A. STEIN, STEIN ON PERSONAL INJURY DAMAGES TREATISE§ 4:60 CLEAR AND CONVINCING
EVIDENCE STANDARD (3rd ed) (WL database updated April 2006); See also 22 AM. JUR. 2d Damages § 706 VI.
Practice and Procedure B. Evidence 1. Burden; Sufficiency of Proof, Punitive or exemplary and multiple damages
(WL database updated May 2006) (requiring clear and convincing evidence and in some jurisdictions, proof beyond
a reasonable doubt).
214
Rustad, supra note 35, at 1300.
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It may come as little surprise that there has been regressive tort reform at the federal level
in the area of prison litigation that achieves all three goals, i.e. making it harder for prisoners to
get into court, making it more difficult to win once they are there, and restricting damage
recoveries for them when they do win.215 As James Robertson notes,

The [Prison Litigation Reform Act] constrains inmates by requiring them to
exhaust administrative remedies before bringing suit; pay filing fees; and forgo
damages for emotional injuries absent a prior physical injury. While the Act
permits the judiciary to sua sponte dismiss claims failing to state a cause of
action, its power to grant prospective relief cannot extend beyond correcting the
right in question; and the relief can be terminated within two years or, in some
instances, sooner. In addition, the Act caps fees for attorneys and special
masters.216

These reforms severely limit victims rights to access to justice and compensation for the
violation of their rights. The extent of the limits placed on prisoners, the most vulnerable and
politically disempowered minority population in our country is particularly troubling. It, is the
most drastic demonstration of the symbiotic relationship between the loss of political equality
and the further erosion of rights through regressive tort reform.

B. The Role of the Supreme Court in Regressive Tort “Reform”

215

Prison Litigation Reform Act Pub. L. No. 104-134, 110 Stat. 1321 (1996).
James Robertson, The Jurisprudence of the PLRA: Inmates as "Outsiders" and the Countermajoritarian
Difficulty, 92 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 187, 188-189 (2002) (Fall 2001/Winter 2002). President William Clinton
signed this bill into law.
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For the greater part of the history and evolution of American tort law, the U.S. the
Supreme Court has not been a central actor. Few, if any, of the major advances in tort law during
the 60s and 70s are credited to that institution.217 This is because, tort law is traditionally either a
part of state common law or state and federal statutory law. Heavy involvement by the Supreme
Court in either of these areas raises the possibility of activism, either in the form of the court
overstepping boundaries based on federalism concerns or overstepping boundaries based on
separation of powers concerns. Of course, it may be contended that either the states or Congress
has overstepped rather than the Supreme Court.
In either event, significant legal change in the area of civil litigation and torts at the
Supreme Court level signals that something more significant is a-foot than the normal ebb and
flow of state based tort reform initiatives. While the wave of tort reform beginning in the 80s is
not generally credited to the Supreme Court,218 the Court has played a very strong supporting
role in that movement, both in its rhetoric,219 and in its decisions during the last two decades. The
court has had a significant impact on the broader category of civil litigation, and this impact is
commensurate with regressive tort reform in general. The Supreme Court, has, in effect put its
imprimatur on the movement.
Andrew Siegel in a careful and thorough piece, paints a picture of the Rehnquist Court as
a Court with an overarching hostility to litigation.220 As Seigel states, “In case after case and in
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See, e.g., Rustad & Koenig, supra note 17, at 105, Appendix One: American Tort Law Timeline: 1200-2002. The
notable exception is in the area of the first amendment.
218
Most of it has been carried out state by state through legislation and in their courts. See eg,. FEINMAN, supra note
8, at 44.
219
Note the many jibes in the cases limiting the ability of plaintiffs to seek relief in the courts . Siegel, supra note
26, at 1124, footnote 102 (mainly coming from Scalia). Note also the rhetoric in the punitive damages cases of
damages “running wild.” Pac. Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Haslip, 499 U.S. 1, 18 (1991) [Hereinafter Haslip].
220
Siegel, supra note 26, at 1097. Although Siegel is not the first to identify this attitude, he is the first to draw it
out as an overarching theme of the court. For earlier, more partial references to the idea, See Vicki C. Jackson,
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wildly divergent areas of the law, the Rehnquist Court has expressed a profound hostility to
litigation.”221 Seigel’s point is not to dismiss the voluminous existing explanatory narratives of
the court such as, federalism, conservatism, or even judicial supremacy, but to show that they
are incomplete and misleading without an understanding of the Court’s hostility to litigation.222
This hostility is not an even handed hostility to all litigants alike. It manifests itself most
prominently to the disadvantage of plaintiff’s, and common people, and to the advantage of
defendants and legal fictions, namely states and other corporate entities. 223
Siegel finds it curious that this hostility coexists with “the Court’s concurrent
commitment to an aggressive form of judicial supremacy”224 and he explores a range of
explanatory vectors, not least of which is the strong correlation between a conservative social
vision and the cases in which the Court has shown the most hostility to litigation as well as when
it seems to most zealously promote its supremacy.225 Other explanatory vectors include an
oversimplified view of separation of powers,226 and the structure and sociology of the American
legal profession within which there is a tendency for the best trained and best connected lawyers
(including the members of the Court and their associates) to congregate in civil defense and
constitutional litigation rather than in personal injury.227

Seductions of Coherence, State Sovereign Immunity, and the Denationalization of Federal Law, 31 RUTGERS L. J.
691, 706-19 (2000) (identifying "hostility to litigation" as one of the themes behind the court’s 1999 sovereign
immunity decisions).
221
Siegel, supra note 26, at 1117. While I track Siegel’s treatment of the Court’s hostility to litigation the treatment
below focuses on how that hostility translates into undermining democratic values.
222
Id. at 1102.
223
As Siegel notes, “Any survey of the Rehnquist Court's hostility to litigation, however cursory, must begin with
the obvious: In myriad ways, the Court has made life very difficult for civil plaintiffs.” Id. at 1117. Siegel notes that
while the court is generally hostile to litigation, it treats “plaintiffs litigation” as particularly “demeaning and
disreputable.” Id. at 1201.
224
Id. at 1098.
225
Id. at 1199-1200.
226
Id. at 1200-1201. Although Siegel sees this as one possible explanatory vector, he notes that it is not an
explanation that is consistent with a number of the court’s decisions. Id. at footnote 458 (referring to the discussion
in the text accompanying footnotes 109-110. The implausibility of this explanation is further explored below).
227
Id. at 1202.
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The democracy based explanation, which is not directly pursued by Siegel, but which is
consistent with both Supreme Court elitism and certain aspects of a conservative social vision, is
that the Court lacks sufficient concern for democratic values. The point is not to simply trot out
the old hobby horse of counter-majoritarianism (i.e. the court is an activist Court with little
respect for other democratic institutions)228 but that many of the Court’s decisions undermine
democratic accountability and fail to accord equal concern and respect for everyone who is
affected by their decisions.
Those cases which evidence the Court’s hostility to litigation most directly include cases
involving the Court’s reluctance to provide remedies for those whose rights have been violated,
official immunity and fee shifting statutes cases, punitive damages cases, cases that involve the
Federal Arbitration Act and state sovereign immunity cases.

1. Constricting remedies

A number of authors have commented on the Court’s constriction of remedies for those
whose rights have been violated.229 One of the most recent authors to address this issue is
Andrew Seigel, who analyzes four paradigm case,230 out of many, 231 in which the Rehnquist
228

See, e.g., Rachel E. Barkow, More Supreme Than Court? The Fall of the Political Question Doctrine and the
Rise of Judicial Supremacy, 102 COLUM. L. REV. 237 (2002); Louis D. Bilionis, The New Scrutiny, 51 EMORY L. J.
481, 495 (2002); Ruth Colker & James J. Brudney, Dissing Congress, 100 MICH. L. REV. 80, 130 (2001). Note that
courts are not categorically counter-majoritarian. Given the evidence above concerning the “representative”
branches and Richard Abel’s work, Abel, supra note 33, there is no reason to think that the courts are less likely to
provide democratically justifiable decisions in the area of torts.
229
See Goldberg, supra note 40 (arguing for a Constitutional Right to an adequate legal scheme for the redress of
wrongs); Christopher J. Roederer, Another Case in Lochner’s Legacy, The Court’s Assault on New Property 54
DRAKE L. REV. 321, 341-42, 342-351, 360 (2006); Andrew Siegel & Daniel J. Meltzer, The Supreme Court's
Judicial Passivity, 2002 SUP. CT. REV. 343 (2002); Judith Resnik, Constricting Remedies: The Rehnquist Judiciary,
Congress, and Federal Power, 78 IND. L. J. 223 (2003).
230
Alexander v. Sandoval, 532 U.S. 275 (2001) (no private right of action exists to enforce the disparate impact
regulations barring entities who receive federal funds from adopting policies that have the "effect" of discriminating
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Court has undermined the traditional view that rights imply remedies for their violation.232 He
analyzes these cases in considerable detail noting that in every case there was an acknowledged
or assumed injury to a defined legal interest and there was Supreme Court precedent supporting
relief.233
It is interesting to note that the Court at times attempts to justify these decisions on
democratic grounds.234 Siegel phrases the court’s democratic justification in terms of ensuring
that coercive sanctions are not imposed without careful communal deliberation.235 This line of
argument is rooted in separation of powers concerns, namely concerns that the courts not
encroach on the prerogatives of representative institutions to make the law and determine
whether there should be remedies for the breach of law.236 In a number of these cases, the Court
appears to engage in a dialogue with Congress and or the states, imploring them to speak more
clearly if they wish to create private remedies.237
However, it is difficult for this explanation of the Court’s decisions to hold up, given the
Court’s assault on §1983 claims, for that assault is in direct conflict with the spirit, if not the

on the basis of race) Correctional Serv. Corp. v. Malesko, 534 U.S. 61 (2001) (Bivens action (private remedy for
Constitutional right violation not available for a federal prisoner held in a private correctional facility in a claim
against the corporation for violation of the Eighth Amendment's prohibition on "cruel and unusual punishment.");
Great-West Life & Annuity Ins. Co. v. Knudson, 534 U.S. 204 (2002) (a remedial provision of the Employee
Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (ERISA) does not provide a right of recovery); Gonzaga Univ. v. Doe, 536
U.S. 273 (2002) (private individuals harmed by violations of the Family Educational Rights and Privacy Act of 1974
(FERPA) cannot seek redress under 42 U.S.C. § 1983).
231
Siegel lists several cases but does not include Castle Rock v. Gonzales, 125 S. Ct. 2796 (2005) (dismissing
respondent’s case for failing to establish that she had a property right in the enforcement of a mandatory restraining,
thereby failing to establish that she had a right that was worthy of procedural due process protection which would
provide a right to sue under 42 U.S.C. § 1983).
232
Siegel, supra note 26, at 1118-1129.
233
Id. at 1122.
234
Id. at 1129.
235
Id.
236
Siegel refers to Corr Servs. Corp. v. Malesko (534 U.S. 204, 67-69 (2002)) which discusses a number of cases
limiting remedies to civil litigants on the grounds of separation of powers). Siegel, supra note 26, at footnote 119.
237
Siegel refers to Gonzaga University v. Does, (536 US 273, 280-81 (2002)) (describing the need for congress to
speak clearly of its intention to create a private remedy) Siegel, supra note 26. See also Castle Rock, 125 S. Ct. at
2806 (quoting Colo. Rev. Stat. § 18-6-803.5(a)–(b) (1999)). It is doubtful that the Court in Castle Rock was genuine.
See, Roederer, supra note 229, at, 341-42, 342-351, 360.
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letter of §1983 under which Congress explicitly provided for the right to a remedy for the
violation of federal law, including constitutional law.238 This is not only evidenced by some of
the cases mentioned above, including Gonzaga and Castle Rock, but also in cases where the
court has expanded official immunity from damages under §1983 and its decisions which make it
harder to recoup attorneys fees under §1983.239
These decisions fly in the face of democratic concerns, not only by undermining
“democratically” passed legislation but by undermining mechanisms designed to help
consolidate and protect democratic rights.
A similar pattern is found in the Court’s expansion of the doctrine of qualified immunity
over the last twenty years which have resulted in more stringent standards for determining a
clearly established right as well as greater tolerance for errors of judgments on the part of
officials claiming the immunity.240 The result is that it is harder in these cases for victims who
have had recognized rights violated to vindicate those rights.241

238

Oddly, the Court uses arguments and policy drawn from implied right of actions cases (under which separation of
powers concerns perhaps justifiably act to limit the court in creating rights of action) to limit §1983 claims. This is
odd because §1983 was specifically enacted to provide rights of action and thus the Court is undermining the
separation of powers when it denies such claims. See Siegel, supra note 26, at 1126 and Roederer, supra note 229, at
321-69.
239
See Siegel, supra note 26, at 1126, 1130.
240
Id. at 1130-31, footnote 123 (also see the cases cited therein); see Brosseau v. Haugen, 543 U.S. 194, 198 (2004)
(per curium) But see the handful of cases where the Court has limited overly expansive interpretations/ applications
of immunity by circuit courts e.g., Hope v. Pelzer, 536 U.S. 730, 739 (2002) (holding that the circuit court erred in
applying a "rigid gloss" to the qualified immunity standard that denied relief to tort plaintiffs if there was no prior
case with "materially similar" facts where a constitutional violation had been established); Johnson v. Jones, 515
U.S. 304, 307 (1995) (unanimously holding, contrary to the position of a number of circuits, that an order denying
summary judgment in a qualified immunity case because of uncertainty about the factual sufficiency of the
allegations was not immediately appealable).
241
Siegel, supra note 26, at 1131-32; see e.g., Richard H. Fallon, Jr., The "Conservative" Paths of the Rehnquist
Court's Federalism Decisions, 69 U. CHI. L. REV. 429, 482-84 (2002); Jackson, supra note 220, at 691, 707
(locating the Supreme Court's 1999 sovereign immunity decisions in the context of a variety of other anti-litigation
initiatives of the Rehnquist Court and offering the Court's "hostility to litigation" as one of many overlapping themes
motivating those decisions). David Rudovsky, The Qualified Immunity Doctrine in the Supreme Court: Judicial
Activism and the Restriction of Constitutional Rights, 138 U. PA. L. REV. 23 (1989) (arguing that the doctrine is
based on right wing judicial activism). The push for the immunity of corporate entities is not confined to the state.
FEINMAN, supra note 8, at 33-34.
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2. Access to Fee Shifting

Fee shifting legislation which allowed for those suing to vindicate their civil rights to
claim attorneys fees when they prevailed in their cases constituted a very important and
progressive development for civil litigants.242 This development accompanied the Civil Rights
of 1964 and was later incorporated into the Civil Rights Attorney’s Fees Act of 1976. That
reform helped to ensure that the rights won on paper, and which evidence the coming to age of
our democracy, could actually be vindicated in practice. This reform not only made it easier for
victims to obtain counsel, bring claims and receive remedies for the wrongs they suffered, but it
had the further purpose and effect of keeping those hard won democratic gains on track.
Plaintiff’s in these cases are not merely vindicating private wrongs but helping vindicate and
deter public wrongs.
Again, however, the Rehnquist Court has widled away at this mechanism for vindicating
those rights which help keep our democracy on tract. It has done so by narrowing down the class
of “prevailing plaintiffs” and it has done this by devaluing the importance of having the
Constitution, and one’s rights under the Constitution, vindicated. In other words the devaluation
of constitutional rights is not merely the result of this practice, but is in fact the means through
which it is achieved. The Court has denied “prevailing party” status to plaintiff’s in cases where
the decision that the plaintiff’s rights had been violated were not entered into a formal
declaratory judgment or injunction, when although entered into judgment they did not provide a
“substantial benefit” to the claimant, where the claimant only receives nominal damages, and/ or
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See eg., Siegel, supra note 26, at 1136. Civil Rights Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-352, 78 Stat. 243, tit. II & tit.
VII.; see .eg., Fair Housing Amendment Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-430, 102 Stat. 1622, 1623, 1636.; Americans
with Disabilities Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-336, 104 Stat. 328.
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where the claimant whose suit compels the abandonment of an illegal practice or rule is not
accompanied by a binding judicial decree.243
These cases appear to deny the congressionally mandated relief on rather narrow and
technical grounds which are not supported by the separation of powers, nor the democracy
reinforcing purposes of the provisions themselves. The cases which narrowly read “prevailing
party” to exclude those whose rights are vindicated but whose damages are nominal or
insubstantial completely undervalues the federal and constitutional rights these provisions were
designed to help safeguard. The fact that money damages are inadequate or inappropriate in
some of these cases, or that specific performance is more appropriate does not mean that a
vindication of the right is less important or valuable. It demeans the legislation and the rights it
was designed to protect to act as if it was designed to only protect losses that could be, or are,
converted into money damages. Further, to deny the shifting of fees in these cases does the most
damage to the purpose of the legislation, which was to encourage these types of suits.244 This is
because, it is exactly in those cases where there are few monetary damages that it will be most
difficult for plaintiff’s to secure adequate legal representation. Without monetary damages or fee
shifting the attorney’s fees must come from the plaintiff.
3. Punitive Damages

The Supreme Court has also weighed in on punitive damages, and while Siegel is correct
to point out that punitive damages are something of a lightening rod for tort reform advocates, he
is incorrect to think that this is in part due to the fact that they “represent a substantial share of
243

See e.g., Siegel, supra note 26, at 1137. See also Hewitt v. Helms, 482 U.S. 755, 759-60 (1987); Rhodes v.
Stewart, 488 U.S. 1, 3-4 (1988) (per curiam); Farrar v. Hobby, 506 U.S. 103, 115 (1992); Buckhannon Bd. & Care
Home v. W. Va. Dept’s of Health & Human Res., 532 U.S. 598, 605(1994).
244
see Kay v. Ehrler, 499 US 432, 436 (1991).
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the costs of our current regime.”245 Punitive damages are in fact very rare246 and although awards
may be extreme in some cases, the numbers are not significant in light of the vast majority of
cases.247
The Rehnquist Court, unlike any Court before has sought to limit the availability of
punitive damages. The changes in this area have gone from requiring certain procedural
safeguards to substantive limits on the amount of damages.248 Not unlike the fee shifting
limitation, here the Court pegs its substantive limits to compensatory damages,249 thus making
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Siegel, supra note 26, at 1148. See e.g., Rustad & Koegin, supra note 17 at 60-65. Theodore Eisenberg et. al.,
Juries, Judges, and Punitive Damages: Empirical Analyses Using the Civil Justice Survey of State Courts 1992,
1996, and 2001 Data . 3 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 263 (2006) (Hereinafter Eisenberg Et. Al.—Legal Stud.),
available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=912309. As Eisenberg has stated elsewhere, “Misperceptions about juries and
punitive damages are especially strong. Contrary to popular belief, juries rarely award such damages, and award
them especially rarely in products liability and medical malpractice cases. Rather, juries tend to award punitive
damages in intentional misconduct cases. When juries do award punitive damages, they do so in ways that relate
strongly to compensatory awards.” Theodore Eisenberg Et Al., Juries, Judges, and Punitive Damages: An Empirical
Study, 87 CORNELL L. REV. 743, 745 (2002) (Hereinafter known as Eisenberg Et. Al.—Conrnell).
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court, while the rest settle, and this makes the number of punitive damages cases quite deminimus (below 3 in
10,000).
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Eisenberg’s study indicates that most cases involve awards of under $100,000 (60%); over 23% are under
$10,000, and less than 11% are over 1 million. Id. at 270.
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See State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Campbell, 538 U.S. 408, 429 (2003) (striking down a damage award as
excessive); Cooper Indus., Inc. v. Leatherman Tool Group, Inc., 532 U.S. 424, 426, 448 (2001) (holding that
appellate courts should review trial court determinations as to the constitutionality of punitive damage awards de
novo); BMW of N. Am., Inc. v. Gore, 517 U.S. 559, 585-86 (1996) (striking down a damage award as excessive);
Honda Motor Co. v. Oberg, 512 U.S. 415, 418 (1994) (holding that the lax standard for appellate review of punitive
damages mandated by the Oregon Constitution violated the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment);
TXO Prod. Corp. v. Alliance Res. Corp., 509 U.S. 443, 446, 465-66 (1993) (reviewing a punitive damage award for
excessiveness but finding it within constitutional limits); Haslip, 499 U.S. at 23-24 (reviewing both Alabama's
method of assessing punitive damages and the magnitude of an award in a particular case but finding no
constitutional problem); Browning-Ferris Indus. v. Kelco Disposal, Inc., 492 U.S. 257, 259-60 (1989) (holding that
the Excessive Fines Clause of the Eighth Amendment does not apply to punitive damage awards and declining to set
aside a punitive damage award as excessive); Bankers Life & Cas. Co. v. Crenshaw, 486 U.S. 71, 76-80 (1988)
(discussing but declining to answer on prudential grounds major constitutional questions regarding punitive damage
awards). See Michael P. Allen, The Supreme Court, Punitive Damages and State Sovereignty, 13 GEO. MASON L.
REV. 1 (2004).
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In State Farm, although the Court would not make a bright line ratio, it stated that “…in practice, few awards
exceeding a single –digit ratio between punitive and compensatory damages, to a significant degree, will satisfy due
process.” State Farm, 538 U.S. at 410. However the Court did note that “ratios greater than those that this Court has
previously upheld may comport with due process where a particularly egregious act has resulted in only a small
amount of economic damages.” Id. (citing Gore, 517 U.S. at 581-82).
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cases that do not involve high levels of economic damages harder to bring.250 Again, like in the
fee shifting cases, limiting punitive damages, particularly in this fashion, reduce the efficacy of
punitive damages as a way of deterring the egregious behavior of defendants. Whereas above the
Court was undermining the role that fee shifting played in securing federal and constitutional
rights, here, limitations on punitive damages also limits the public policy role that punitive
damages play in deterring some of the worst forms of corporate irresponsibility.251

4. Arbitration Clauses (contracting out of defending claims in court, etc.)

The Court has also gone out of its way to broadly construe the Federal Arbitration Act.
As was noted above, contracting out of courts and into arbitration is one way of circumventing
an institution that is unresponsive to special interest pressures. There may be a tendency to think
that arbitration, as a form of alternative dispute resolution, is thereby progressive.252 At the very
least some might think that it is no less progressive than regular litigation and should be given
equal footing. Seigel in fact acknowledges that the Court’s recognition of Arbitration may have
began as an effort to put arbitration on an equal footing with litigation. However, as he notes, it
has ended up as “a policy-driven assault on the wisdom and propriety of litigation as a
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Siegel, supra note 26, at 1147.
See Catherine M. Sharkey, Punitive Damages as Societal Damages, 113 YALE L. J. 347, 355 (2003); DAN B.
DOBBS, THE LAW OF TORTS §381 (2000); FEINMAN, supra note 8, at 42- 46. Siegel notes that the court is
particularly hostile to litigation in cases like punitive damages where litigation is meant to achieve greater societal
purposes. Siegel, supra note 26, at 1160, footnote 255.
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As Garthy notes, “…mandatory arbitration, …gained support from idealistic academic studies… promoting
"procedural justice." The idea was that arbitration allows individuals to tell their stories, and therefore litigants
perceive the process as a more legitimate form of justice than the usual result of litigation-a negotiated settlement.
Both mediation and arbitration contain a tradition-now seemingly muted-that the results are supposed to be better
than strict enforcement of the law.” Garthy, supra note 172.
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mechanism for resolving such disputes.”253 There is little question that arbitration has its
benefits, particularly in terms of costs to the parties. For equal bargaining partners arbitration
may in fact be superior to litigation.
The Court’s practice, however, has been to ignore the bargaining disparities of the parties
(particularly of economically weaker plaintiffs). As Siegel states, “[i]t has consistently enforced
form arbitration agreements that shift cases from courts to alternative forums without regard for
the practical consequences to potential plaintiffs.”254 There are at least five significant effects of
allowing companies to bind consumers (and smaller less powerful companies) to arbitration.
First, the company gets to choose a venue that is more congenial to it. Second its gets a forum
that has less due process than a court has,255 e.g. in terms of discovery, the right to a jury,256 and
judicial review. Third it can oust the possibility of punitive damages. Fourth, it can eliminate the
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Siegel, supra note 26, at 1141.
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Carrington & Paul H. Haagen, Contract and Jurisdiction, 1996 SUP. CT. REV. 331, 401 (1996) (arguing that the
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Court has created a monster."); Jean R. Sternlight, Rethinking the Constitutionality of the Supreme Court's
Preference for Binding Arbitration: A Fresh Assessment of Jury Trial, Separation of Powers, and Due Process
Concerns, 72 TUL. L. REV. 1 (1997) (critiquing arbitration case law for increasingly favoring arbitral forums without
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of Due Process in American Law, 70 TUL. L. REV. 1945 (1996); Harry T. Edwards, Where Are We Heading with
Mandatory Arbitration of Statutory Claims in Employment?, 16 GA. ST. U. L. REV. 293 (1999); Paul H. Haagen,
New Wineskins for New Wine: The Need to Encourage Fairness in Mandatory Arbitration, 40 ARIZ. L. REV. 1039
(1998); David M. Kinnecome, Where Procedure Meets Substance: Are Arbitral Procedures a Method of Weakening
the Substantive Protections Afforded by Employment Rights Statutes?, 79 B. U. L. REV. 745 (1999); Lewis L.
Maltby, Private Justice: Employment Arbitration and Civil Rights, 30 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 29 (1998); Margo
E. K. Reder, Arbitrating Securities Industry Employment Discrimination Claims: Restructuring a System to Ensure
Fairness, 2 U. PA. J. LAB. & EMP. L. 19 (1999); Richard E. Speidel, Consumer Arbitration of Statutory Claims: Has
Pre-Dispute [Mandatory] Arbitration Outlived Its Welcome?, 40 ARIZ. L. REV. 1069 (1998); Jean R. Sternlight,
Panacea or Corporate Tool?: Debunking the Supreme Court's Preference for Binding Arbitration, 74 WASH. U. L.
Q. 637 (1996); Thomas J. Stipanowich, Contract and Conflict Management, 2001 WISC. L. REV. 831 (2001).
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“Just as important to anyone concerned with the morality of law is the fact that the arbitrator can decide a case
without regard for the law or the facts in a case. There is no predictable outcome, no procedural protection.”
Deborah W. Post, Dismantling Democracy: Common Sense and the Contract Jurisprudence of Frank Easterbrook,
16 TOURO L. REV 1205, 1236 (2000). See also Garthy, supra note 172.
256
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possibility of victims ioining together in class actions to bring suit.257 Finally, as Richard Posner
states, parties are not entitled to awards that are “correct or even reasonable, since neither error
nor clear error, nor even gross error is a ground for vacating an award.”258 All of these factors
benefit the few at the expense of the majority. As Garthy suggests,

It is not the simplistic bias of decision-making structured for the employers or
companies to win. Instead, the bias is found in a system in which only a few
constituencies are comfortable making their arguments and confident that their
concerns will be understood, even if they lose some cases. The bias is also in a
process that selects neutrals who will be safe for the leading lawyers and clientswhoever controls the selection-and rejects those who appear too political, too
unreliable, or too risky even on the basis of cultural stereotypes.259

This is about as undemocratically tailored as a justice system can be. It is perfectly suited
for employers and companies who are repeat players and everyone else, must simply take it, or
go without.260 Deborah Post, in describing the 7th Circuit case of Hill v. Gateway 2000 Inc.,261
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Eliminating class actions means that many consumers with small harms simply won’t pursue claims, thereby
allowing business to defraud large numbers of consumers in small amounts. FEINMAN, supra note 8, at 104. It is
only through joining as a class that they can in any way approximate the power of big business Id. at 80; see also
Post, supra note 255, at 1226. In Gateway, Justice Easterbrooke upheld an “arbitration agreement” that was not
negotiated, but simply shipped with the plaintiffs computer binding the plaintiff/consumer to its terms unless the
consumer shipped the computer back to the manufacturer at its own cost within 30 days (a rolling shrink wrap). Hill
v. Gateway 2000, 105 F.3d 1147 (7th. Cir. 1997) cert. denied 522 U.S. 808, 118 S. Ct. 47 (1997); see also FEINMAN,
supra note 8, at 88. This is just one way of forming binding contracts with little to no notice, much less bargaining.
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in which the agreement is packaged with the product, put on a website or on the computer screen to click. FEINMAN,
supra note 8, at 86.
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IDS Life Insurance Company v. Royal alliance Associates, Inc, 266 F. 3d 645, 650-651 (7th Cir. 2001).
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Garthy, supra note 172, at 933.
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Just as we saw the Court abandoning its fidelity of separation of powers, the Court here abandons its fidelity to
federalism when into comes into conflict with its desire to limit access to the courts through the FAA. Siegel, supra
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states, “The Gateway case …threatens the democratic process on two levels. Not only does it
create a model of contract formation that gives entire control over the terms of the agreement to
one side, it also deprives the less powerful party, the individual consumer, of the only
mechanism she has to directly confront behavior that is predatory, abusive or simply
overreaching.”262
5. States Rights

One of the most dramatic areas of constitutional change has been in the area of “states
rights”. The Court has brought new life to state sovereign immunity in a whole host of cases
through a diverse set of mechanisms.263 The result, as with many of the cases above involving
rights of action, qualified immunity, and arbitration, is that colorable claims are dismissed
without regard for their merit.264 The result is that victims of illegal government conduct are
denied access to justice.265 It also means that one important mechanism for holding government
accountable to the people is eroded, and with it, respect for the rule of law.

note 26, at 1142-3. See e.g., Perry v. Thomas, 482 U.S. 483, 489 (1987) (holding that the FAA preempts state law
protecting access to courts in wage collection actions).
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Gateway, 105 F.3d 1147.
262
Post, supra note 255, at 1235.
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Siegel summarizes the area: “the Court has reaffirmed and firmly constitutionalized the expansive and countertextual reading of the Eleventh Amendment …, held that Congress may not abrogate states' Eleventh Amendment
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properly abrogated the states' immunity pursuant to its Fourteenth Amendment powers, and applied that test with
increasing rigor and skepticism. At the same time, the Court has--without relying on the Eleventh Amendment or
any other textual provision--held that the Constitution's structure requires that the states be accorded sovereign
immunity from suits in their own courts (absent their consent) and from federal administrative proceedings that bear
significant indicia of adjudication. In a variety of less well-known cases, the Court has also narrowed the wellestablished doctrine whereby individuals may, notwithstanding sovereign immunity, seek injunctions against state
officials in their official capacity, made it easier for state officials to obtain dismissal of lawsuits on sovereign
immunity grounds at an early stage in the litigation process, and overruled precedent suggesting that a state does not
posses full Eleventh Amendment immunity when it engages in routine commercial activity. Siegel, supra note 26,
at 1153-54, n 219-228.
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Siegel, supra note 26, at 1163.
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The justification for the revival of state immunity is a somewhat odd anthropomorphism
of the state.266 The idea is that states are somehow endowed with sovereignty, the likes of which
make them susceptible to moral harm or assaults to their dignity. The concept is a throwback to
the days in which Kings and Queens ruled the land, when they were “the sovereign” wholly
capable of suffering indignity at the hands of others. There is considerable debate as to whether
or not dignity actually was the animating idea behind the 11th Amendment and sovereign
immunity.267 The historical argument as to whether or not dignity was crucial to the 11th
amendment and state sovereign immunity is somewhat wayward to our concerns. Like many
issues in legal history, there are arguments and authority on both sides.
As Seigel points out, however, even if dignity was the original rational for the 11th
Amendment, it was a different notion of dignity than the one called forth by the Court today. The
dignity referred to before consisted in the notion that sovereigns were equal and that it was
inappropriate (or undignified) to subject one sovereign to the courts of another sovereign.268 This
purportedly undermined the equality of sovereigns.269 However, the modern focus is on the
indignity of being brought into court (even the state’s own court). While the former view
sounded in notions about the equality of sovereigns, if Siegel is correct, the modern notion is not
animated by equality, but by a sort of elitism which places the state sovereign above its citizens.
266

Siegel notes that Justice Thomas has provided the fullest articulation of the dignity principle, "[t]he preeminent
purpose of state sovereign immunity is to accord the States the dignity that is consistent with their status as
sovereign entities." Id. (citing Fed. Mar. Comm’n, FMC v. South Carolina State Ports Authortity, 535 U.S. 743
(2002)). Siegel, supra note 26, at 1157.
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supra note 26, at 1160.
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As Siegel notes, “As the Court sees it, compelling an unwilling state to defend a private lawsuit
for damages threatens state dignity for much the same reason and in much the same way that
subjecting a private party to such a suit diminishes the dignity and threatens the status of that
private party”270 In other words, for Siegel, its part of a visceral reaction to having to defend
oneself in court.
However, modern states, be they national or federal, like corporations and associations,
are artificial entities, and do not possess the moral qualities needed to have dignity. While the
earlier conception of equal dignity of states vis-a vis other states resonates with democratic
impulses (although it too raises concerns in our global interdependent world),271 the modern form
of the idea, is decidedly undemocratic. Again, the idea is a throwback to pre-democratic times,
when the sovereign made, imposed and was above the law. This is inconsistent with notions of
equality before the law. The Court, in effect, is choosing to protect the “dignity” of the state over
the rights of plaintiff citizens. It is undermining “the rule of law” and equality before the law,
thereby elevating “rule by the sovereign” and undermining democratic accountability.272

VI. CONCLUSION
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Given the political science findings from sections II-IV above, there is little hope that this
work, or anyone else’s academic work, is going to revitalize our democracy. This is not to say
that critical work has no place or no chance of impact. There is some hope that this piece, like
the works of professors Abel, Baker, Feinman and Rustad, among others, will at least demystify
what is at stake in modern tort reform. Demystification is a necessary, although insufficient step
towards transparency, accountability and a revitalized democracy. Although many authors have
all but said what was put so bluntly in the opening sentence to this article, the choice to be
brutally frank about our democracy’s demise was intended to place the present course of tort
“reform” in sharp relief against the unreflective idea that our ship of state and law has been
sailing a steady democratic course for over two hundred years. Although peculiar, this frankness
was inspired in part by the authors of the American Law Institute Restatement (Third) of
Products Liability. Although, their sincerity is dubious in a number of respects,273 their
“restatement” of the law also placed the course of products liability in sharp relief against the
path of the ALI Restatement (Second) of Torts §402A. Their, perhaps overzealous,
crystallization of:
•

the death of strict liability in product design and failure to warn cases (§2);

•

the death of the consumer expectations test, and the requirement that the plaintiff prove
the existence of reasonable alternative design (§2(b));

•

the nearly complete immunity given to prescription drugs (§ 6(c)); and

273

The fact that they attempt to maintain that their restatement is not political, but merely a restatement of existing
laws is as hard to accept as their assertion that the choice between the risk-utility approach to products liability and
the consumer expectation approach is merely a pragmatic choice, a matter of getting it right, like figuring out the
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See, James A. Henderson Jr. & Aron D. Twersky, What Europe, Japan and Other Countries Can Learn from the
New American Restatement of Products Liability, 34 TEX. INT’L L.J. 1, 14. (1999).
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•

the pass given to “unavoidably unsafe” products such as drugs, cigarettes and alcohol,274

made it very clear just how far off course the law of products liability was going from the path of
the Second Restatement, and what was being lost from the perspective of consumer protection
and corporate responsibility. Whether one thinks the Third Restatement was merely a cold but
brutally accurate obituary or a politically motivated attempt to put a bounty on the head of strict
liability, 275 it brought the issue out in stark relief. As Ellen Wertheimer notes, “The Third
Restatement… made it impossible for courts to ignore what they had done, and many did not like
what they saw.”276
What they saw, once the dust settled, was that the risks and losses did not go away. In
fact, those risks and loses fell on innocent consumers who are not only at a disadvantage from
the perspective of making products safer, but who also are not equally equipped to insure for,
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absorb or spread the losses they suffer.277 Although the campaign to see the corporate producer
as the symbol of American freedom -- like a mustang, tethered to a shrub in the desert of socialwelfare tort law, being fed upon by greedy parasitic lawyers and consumers-- persists,278 the
reality is that, when horses run wild, people get trampled. Under the Third Restatement, those
who trample (who profit from putting products into the stream of commerce, who are best placed
to test and make products safe or warn of their hazards, and are best placed to insure against,
absorb and spread the risks and losses) now have a much better chance at avoiding responsibility
and liability for those losses. This not only raises the risk of being trodden (by undermining the
deterrent effect of products liability law) but it also raises the risk that once trodden upon, the
consumer must bear the loss.
Although she is perhaps overly optimistic, Wertheimer’s argument, that “the courts are
now in the process of reaffirming their commitment to retaining--or reinstating--the doctrine [of
strict liability]” because they did not like what they saw, provides some hope that if people see
clearly what is at stake in the current wave of tort reform, they may actually react progressively,
putting torts back to work for democratic progress.

277

As Reisman notes, “In the United States, accident victims are not nearly protected comprehensively. In 1997, 16
% of all Americans and 37 % of the low-income population had no health coverage at all, and the number kept
rising. Only 66 % of the adult workforce have disability benefits, and these benefits are usually less than ample. All
States have enacted workers compensation schemes but the compensation they pay is fairly low and often
insufficient to make ends meet. Overall, social and workers insurance cover only about three-fifths of the economic
consequences of accidents, forcing victims to bear the remaining 40 % themselves.” Reisman, supra note 59, at
828.
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See, e.g. Deborah J. La Fetra, Freedom, Responsibility, and Risk: Fundamental Principles Supporting Tort
Reform, 36 IND. L. REV. 645, 645 (“The free enterprise system is the engine that drives America’s healthy economy,
the benefits of which necessarily include inherent risks. Unfortunately, many facets of America’s civil justice system
operate to shift all of those risks to the entrepreneurs who produce the consumer goods and services that make
people’s lives easier or more pleasant….The tort system has undergone a transformation from one designed solely to
redress wrongs to one focusing more and more on criminal-style retribution and redistribution of wealth .”)
Although it is doubtful that this statement was ever true, it may have come closer to the truth some 30 years ago, but
not today.
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